The New Scholasticism

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by Kevin F. Doherty

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by Robert Paul Mohan

Alteration in Aristotle
by Robert R. Barr

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Volume XXX OCTOBER, 1956 Number 4

PAGES

ii 409

. 441

. 461

. 472

r 485

r 490

. 492

r 493

. 497

r 499

. 501

Keith's *Introduction to Philosophical Psychology*
JOHN A. OTTO 503

Brown and Ghiselli's *Scientific Method in Psychology*
CHARLES J. D. CORCORAN, O. P. 505

Armas' *La Moral de San Agustin*
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Volume XXX **OCTOBER, 1956** **Number 4**

Articles

Putting the Square Back into Opposition
JOAN B. OGDEN and HENRY B. VEATCH 409

God and the Good in Plato..KEVIN F. DOHERTY, S. J. 441

It There a Philosophy of History?
ROBERT PAUL MOHAN, S. S. 461

The Nature of Alteration in Aristotle
ROBERT R. BARR, S. J. 472

Chronicle

From the Secretary's Desk.....CHARLES A. HART 485

Book Reviews

John of St. Thomas' *Outlines of Formal Logic*
G. DONALD HOLLENHORST 490

Kirk's *Academic Freedom*.....LEO R. WARD, C. S. C. 492

Toulemont's *Sociologie et pluralisme dialectique*
CHRISTOPHER M. LEHNER, O. P. 493

Arnett's *Santayana and the Sense of Beauty*
ROBERT E. MCCALL, S. S. J. 497

Marc's *Dialectique de l'affirmation*...VENANT CAUCHY 499

Kroner's *Kant's Weltanschauung* R. W. MULLIGAN, S. J. 501

Reith's *Introduction to Philosophical Psychology*
JOHN A. OTTO 503

Brown and Ghiselli's *Scientific Method in Psychology*
CHARLES J. D. CORCORAN, O. P. 505

Armas' *La Moral de San Agustin*
FRANK DE LA VEGA, O. R. S. A. 507

Dougherty's *Logic: An Introduction to Aristotelian Formal Logic*.....Owen Bennett, O. F. Conv. 509

Pieper's *Justice*.....Herbert Johnston 511

O'Neil's *Imprudence in St. Thomas* Gerald B. Phelan 513

Saint Augustine's *The Problem of Free Choice* Sr. Mary Ann Ida, B. V. M. 514

Books Received..... 518

Notes on the Authors..... 484

Index to Volume XXX.....

Putting the Square Back into Opposition[1]

by Joan B. Ogden and Henry B. Veatch

THERE IS NOTHING quite like the dead for coming to life again. Or at least so it would seem in the case of the Square of Opposition. Having been drawn and quartered and given, if not an honorable burial, at least a supposedly final one by the symbolic logicians, the ancient Square, to the amazement of everyone, once more stalks the pages of the journals.

But just what is one to make of this Square *redivivus*? Many, of course, will simply dismiss it as just one more instance of "the triumph of Barbarism and Religion." But to others who are perhaps rather more disposed to recognize more things in heaven and earth than the symbolic logicians have dreamed of in their philosophy, it may nonetheless be somewhat puzzling to know just what the status of the Square is. Has the Square really been revived? Or is it a mere ghostly fraud? And if it be genuine, what is its true complexion? For its would-be revivers seem not to have been mere traditionalists, but revivers with reservations; and to complicate matters still more, they have vigorously differed from one another as to just what the conditions are under which the old Square may now go about its new-found life.

[1] This paper owes much to the stimulation which one of the authors, Mr. Veatch, has received from the various private and published interchanges which he has had with Monsignor John J. Doyle, in regard to the whole matter of the opposition of propositions. While we fear that Monsignor Doyle will scarcely accept our conclusions, we hope that he may at least accept our thanks.

I

Clearly, though, if the mystery of this new life is ever to be unveiled, it would seem that one must first reconsider the circumstances of the original death and burial. For just what was it that proved fatal to the old Square? Ironically enough, it would appear to have been nothing more nor less than existence —or, to use the more logical lingo, "existential import." For as the new symbolic logicians began to scrutinize the traditional categorical proposition, it struck them that such a proposition was presumed not merely to assert a predicate of a subject, but also to assert the existence of the subject. This, however, appeared to compromise hopelessly the integrity of the categorical proposition, to say nothing of that of the Square as well.

For one thing, if the traditional S–P proposition involved not just one assertion but two, then it was necessarily exponible; and, so far from being a simple categorical or atomic proposition, as the traditional logicians had supposed, it was really a compound or molecular one. Further, to suppose that an ordinary S–P proposition really involved a double assertion had the effect of completely upsetting the relations in the Square of Opposition. For now instead of oppositions of simple propositions based on quantity and quality, we would have oppositions between conjunctions. But if an A and an O and an E and an I is each of them a conjunctive proposition, then one cannot possibly be the contradictory of the other, and the doom of the Square would thereby appear to be sealed irrevocably.[2]

Nor is that all. For as soon as we consider the traditional categorical proposition as really involving a covert assertion of

[2] In asserting in common the existence of S's the contradictories are in partial agreement with each other and hence become contraries:

$$(Ex)\ fx\ .\ —\ (Ex)\ (fx\ .\ —gx)$$
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the existence of the subject, then it soon becomes painfully obvious that such a supposed assertion of existence frequently conflicts with ordinary usage. For consider the following:

(1) All bodies not acted upon by external forces continue in a state of uniform motion or rest.
(2) All trespassers will be prosecuted.

If the assertion of a categorical proposition involves not merely the assertion of a predicate of a subject, but also the assertion of the existence of the subject, would not a recognition of the truth of either (1) or (2) commit one to admitting the existence of trespassers, in the one case, or of physical bodies immune to external forces, in the other? But this would seem little short of preposterous. And, as if this were not enough to have to swallow, what is to be done with assertions about such things as ogres, square-circles, and the present King of France? Are human beings, not to speak of logicians, really reduced to such straits that they cannot make any true statements about such things without thereby recognizing that things of the sort actually exist? Surely not. Indeed, it's not surprising that a really forthright human being and logician like Lord Russell should have simply dismissed the whole lot of A, E, I and O propositions, as traditionally understood, with what in effect amounted to a flat "This-will-never-do."

Moreover, everyone is familiar with the more or less Draconian legislation which the symbolic logicians introduced in order to deal with the troublesome item of the existential import of propositions and at the same time retain the relation of contradictory opposition between propositions.[8] To begin with, they simply decreed that only particular propositions, and not universals, were to be regarded as having existential import.

[8] No doubt the Boolean algebra of classes, through which the categorical proposition becomes a statement about the membership of classes, largely made possible this reformation of the Square.

Further they stipulated that assertions to the effect that some S's are P's, or some S's are not P's, were to be regarded as saying no more and no less than:

(3) There is, or exists, at least one thing, such that it is both S and P.

(4) There is, or exists, at least one thing such that it is both S and non-P.

Finally, they rigorously reasoned that since E's and A's were no more than the contradictories of I's and O's, and since the latter, as rendered by (3) and (4), were no more than assertions of the existence of S–P's, on the one hand, and of S–non–P's on the other, therefore E and A propositions were no more than denials of the existence of S–P's, and of S–non–P's respectively:

(3.1) There does not exist (or it is false that there exists) anything that is both S and P.

(4.1) There does not exist (or it is false that there exists) anything that is both S and non-P.

Such, in brief, were the measures of reform imposed and enforced by the symbolic logicians. And while they might seem rather harsh, so far as our accustomed habits of thinking and speaking are concerned, they certainly managed to eliminate the scandals. Existential import was acknowledged and recognized, but not at the cost of sacrificing the law of contradiction. And, likewise, universal propositions were interpreted as involving no more than a bare minimal assertion, which would make it possible to employ them regardless of whether one was talking about "bodies not acted upon by external forces" or about "S's" that actually exist. In neither case would the use of a universal proposition commit one to admitting either the existence of nonexistent S's or the nonexistence of existent ones.

But, of course, a price was paid for all this. And though when reckoned in the coin of mathematical logic, it seemed

cheap, when reckoned by the standards of ordinary language, it was high indeed. For one thing, even though the new logic-by-decree had saved the relation of contradiction, it had killed the Square. And in similar fashion, though it had clearly reckoned with existential import, it had eliminated predication, or what might be called predicative import, altogether.

Nevertheless, the full amount of these exactions, we feel, has not always been too well appreciated. True, it has been generally recognized that the result of the Square's reformation was no Square at all, only the bare bones of an X remaining.[4] But what is not so generally recognized is that this drastic curtailing of relations of opposition is but the inevitable result of the elimination of the ancient subject-predicate type of proposition in favor of the equally ancient existence type of proposition.[5]

[4] All the relations represented by the Square outline of the old Square failed; only the X of contradictory opposition remained. Actually it is in the nature of a concession to the older logic that the X form is retained at all. In the original square all four forms were about the same thing, i. e., had the same subject. In the revised form the A and O are about S's that are non-P's, whereas the E and the I are about S's that are P's. On this basis there is scarcely any justification for the X, the intersecting diagonals themselves actually being unrelated to each other. Consequently it is no coincidence that the relations of the Square which fail are actually those which involve deducing the truth value of a proposition about one kind of thing (say, S-P's) from the truth value of a proposition about something very different (say, S-non-P's).

[5] It is, of course, quite inaccurate to say that either Russell or the symbolic logicians generally intended to eliminate subject-predicate propositions altogether. On the contrary, for them a propositional function could be turned into a proposition either by quantifying the argument variables or by replacing such variables with individual expressions. In the latter case the singular propositions that resulted were to be regarded as genuine subject-predicate propositions. Nevertheless, as is well known, no individual expressions could ever be found that could meet the requirements of a "logically proper name." In consequence, the subject-predicate proposition proved to be little more than a myth, and the existential proposition remained as the only reality.

Nor is it entirely accurate simply to identify the existential statements of modern symbolic logic with what we have called "existence propositions," as we have done in the interests of brevity. For the symbolic logician would

In fact, the account of opposition that is usually given by symbolic logicians is nothing but an account of such opposition as befits existence propositions, to the complete neglect of the sort of opposition that holds between subject-predicate propositions.

And yet just what do we mean by this distinction between subject-predicate propositions and existence propositions? Briefly, we might say that it is a propositional distinction based on the rather obvious consideration that a recognition of what a thing is is different from a recognition of the fact that it is. In the former case one asserts that S is P; in the latter, one asserts simply that S is or exists, or that there is an S.

Now what would be a more plausible distinction than this? Both types of proposition would seem to be quite indispensable for their respective purposes. Nor would there appear to be any initial reason or justification for trying to reduce the one type to the other, or to eliminate the one in favor of the other. And yet many of us will readily recall the painful and misguided efforts of not a few of the older textbook writers in Aristotelian logic to try to reduce existence propositions to the subject-predicate form. Thus 'Men exist' or 'There is a Santa Claus' were contorted or distorted into 'Men are real' or 'Santa Claus is an existent entity.' But even apart from the obvious artificiality of such attempts, their failure was inevitable from

certainly insist that nothing could be more important than maintaining the distinction between them. From Russell's theory of descriptions right down to Quine's discussions of reference, one of the major concerns of modern logicians has been to show how any existence proposition can and should be replaced by a properly existential statement. But however important this distinction may be in other contexts, it would seem to have no bearing on the issues discussed in the present section. In connection with section IV we shall note this distinction between the existential statements of modern logic and the more old-fashioned existence propositions of everyday language, but we shall argue that the distinction, though it might there become pertinent, will at the same time be rendered largely unnecessary by the particular theory of existential import which we shall there be defending. (cf. *infra* esp. note 25).

the start, for the quite simple reason that existence is not and cannot be a predicate.[6]

On the other hand, considering the way the symbolic logicians in more recent times have tried to handle propositions, we maintain that they have fallen into precisely the reverse error. They have tried to eliminate subject-predicate propositions in favor of propositions of the existence type. True, in their symbolic representations of traditional categorical propositions [cf. *supra*, (3) and (4) and 3.1) and 4.1)], it would seem that in such cases, the symbolic logicians would consider the propositional assertion to be about S's that are P's (or non–P's) rather than about mere S's. Still, it is obvious from these same symbolic formulations that in each case the proposition is to be understood as either affirming or denying the existence of such S–P's (or S–non–P's) rather than as predicating something of them. In short, on the symbolic logicians' handling of propositions, we are simply left without any propositional resource for asserting *what* anything is or is not. Or to put it another way, existential import is stressed to the complete exclusion of predicative import.

Moreover, unless we are very much mistaken, it was precisely such a reduction of all subject-predicate propositions to propositions of the existence type that made inevitable the compressing of the ancient Square into a mere X. For the sort of opposition that holds between existence propositions is not the same as that which holds between subject-predicate propositions. In the case

[6] This should have been obvious not merely to logicians since Kant, but even to logicians in the Aristotelian and scholastic traditions. For the latter, existence could not be a predicate, since it could not be subsumed under the heads of any of the categories or predicaments. Nor could existence properly be treated as one of the transcendentals. The nearest thing to it in the list of the latter would be "thing" or "being." But to say that X is something, or is a being, is not the same as to say that X is or exists. Indeed Gilson has made much of the fact that the existence proposition is of a type that is truly *sui generis*. Cf. *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949) Ch. VI.

of the latter, differences in the quantity and quality of the propositions determine the customary oppositions of contrariety, contradiction, sub-contrariety, and subalternation. On the other hand, in the case of existence propositions, there can be presumably no opposition save that of existential contradiction: 'Square circles exist' or 'Square circles do not exist'; 'There are pink rats on the wall' or 'There are no pink rats on the wall,' etc.[7]

It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that having eliminated the subject-predicate proposition from circulation altogether, the symbolic logicians should have simply withdrawn the Square from opposition as well. In any event, as is well known, having ruthlessly carried out their various reforms and executions, the symbolic logicians proceeded to sit back complacently. Did anything more remain to be said?

II

Well, as we all know now, a great deal more did remain to be said and is currently being said. In fact, just as Russell had exclaimed of what the traditional logicians had done, so Strawson and Hart have now exclaimed of what Russell did, "This will never do!" Further, the magic words of Strawson about the "referring use" of terms seem to have rolled the stone away, and there have now emerged from the tomb once again, not just the subject-predicate proposition, but also its inseparable companion in death as in life—the Square of Opposition!

[7] For instance, if one attempts in the case of existence propositions to set up other relations in opposition besides that of contradiction, one soon finds that the enterprise is forced and implausible. For instance, what is the sub-contrary of 'Square circles exist'? Is it 'Many a square-circle does not exist'? Or what is the subaltern of 'There are no pink rats on the wall'? Is it, 'There are some pink rats not on the wall'? Clearly, these examples are so farfetched that anyone can readily see that ordinary relations of opposition, as these are exhibited in the Square, just do not pertain to existence propositions.

However it still remains to be seen whether Strawson and Hart have merely brought the Square back to life, or whether they have also succeeded in making an honest man of it as well. For whatever may be said of the somewhat summary procedures by which the subject-predicate proposition was originally eliminated from the scene, the fact remains that the seeming existential import of such propositions gave rise to very real difficulties, so far as the relations in the Square are concerned. Have the ordinary language people, then, adequately disposed of these difficulties? Unfortunately, we think not entirely so.

To return to a consideration of these difficulties, it may be remembered that the first such difficulty concerned the supposed dual assertion that is involved in the assertion of any categorical proposition. For such propositions were held to involve not just the assertion of a predicate of a subject, but also the assertion of the existence of the subject. But this being so, such propositions would all of them appear to be exponible. And if exponible, then the relations of opposition between such propositions, as these are set forth in the traditional Square, would be for the most part destroyed.

Now this difficulty, it would seem, Strawson does manage to meet with both assurance and dispatch. Refusing to go in for the sort of *ad hoc* patching up of the Square [8] which so many contemporary logicians have attempted in an effort to preserve some semblance of the traditional relationships, Strawson prefers to obviate the necessity for such patch work by directly challenging the presupposition on which it rests—the presupposition, namely, that ordinary subject-predicate propositions are exponible. And the reason such a presupposition is unwarranted, he feels, is that it involves a rather elementary confusion of the conditions [9] of the truth of an assertion with the

[8] Cf. his *Introduction to Logical Theory* (London and New York, 1952) pp. 171 ff.

[9] Cf. "On Referring," *Mind*, LIX (1950) 324. Also, *Introduction to Logical Theory*, p. 178.

actual assertion itself. Thus, for example, when one asserts a proposition of the form 'Every S is P,' one's assertion could scarcely be true if there were no S's. And yet this need hardly be taken to mean that in asserting 'Every S is P,' one is thereby actually making two assertions: (a) that every S is P and (b) that there are S's.

Indeed, the distinction between the conditions of an assertion and the assertion itself is exceedingly well taken. It is certainly a condition of the truth of one's assertion that the terms contained in it be not meaningless; and yet such a condition is not an exponible part of the assertion itelf. Or again, it is certainly a condition of the truth of "All men are mortal" that 'mortal' be universally predicable of 'man'; but clearly an assertion of the former is not as such an assertion of the latter. Otherwise, the distinction between use and mention would break down completely.

But supposing the first difficulty to have been thus successfully met, a second difficulty seems therewith to become all the more acute. For given the integrity of subject-predicate propositions, and granting also that the existence of S's is a condition of the truth of such propositions, what happens if in a given instance there are no S's? To anyone who is given to following the ordinary uses of language more or less naively, it would doubtless seem that the answer would be: "In such a case the proposition would be false." But to Strawson and Hart, whose following of ordinary use is never at the expense of their sophistication, such an answer would be out of the question.

For suppose they should follow ordinary use and say that a given assertion of the form 'Every S is P' is false simply because there are no S's, then by the very rules of the Square which Strawson and Hart have done so much to bring miraculously back to life, the corresponding O proposition would have to be true. And yet it would certainly seem that the S term

is used referringly in the case of the O quite as much as in that of the A. Hence if the existence of S's be a condition of the truth of the A, it must likewise be a condition of the truth of the O. However, the presupposition in the present instance is that there are no S's. Accordingly, the O would have to be considered false quite as much as its contradictory opposite, the A. No, to suppose that a universal S–P proposition may be false, on the ground that there are no S's, is simply to expose once more the categorical proposition, as well as the Square, to the murderous thrusts of that favorite henchman of Russell's, the present King of France.

But then what are Strawson and Hart to do? If a universal categorical proposition is not to be considered false in the event that there are no instances of the subject term, is it then to be considered true? But this is the alternative which the symbolic logicians allowed themselves to be forced into and which Strawson and Hart are most determined to avoid. For they insist—and quite rightly so—that there is something radically wrong with a logical theory that would compel one to accept as true any and every universal categorical proposition whose subject term lacks instances, and for no other reason than that there are no instances of the subject.[10]

Indeed, in Strawson's and Hart's eyes this alternative appears little short of ridiculous at times. For imagine a situation in which one is being urged to step out of a window and is assured,

(5) "All the rungs of the ladder are safe to step on,"

when actually there is no ladder, nor any rungs of a ladder either. Strawson and Hart would certainly recognize that in such a situation, such a person would no doubt feel more than bruised when he picked himself off the ground. Nor would he

[10] Cf. the very telling examples which Hart cites in support of this contention in "A Logician's Fairy Tale," *Philosophical Review*, LX (1951) 210-211.

be likely to feel any the less deceived when the symbolic logician points out to him, "But, my good man, that statement *was* true—it only asserted that there was nothing whatever that is both a rung of a ladder and unsafe to step on."

But is the Strawson-Hart answer any more satisfactory? As is well known, Strawson and Hart have devised the ingenious alternative of saying that it is neither true nor false. But given (5) and such circumstances of its assertion as we have described, will our injured victim be any more consoled to hear that he has been taken in by a statement which is meaningful, but neither true nor false?—that, as Strawson would tell him, in such circumstances the question of the truth or falsity of the statement just does not arise?

At this point we propose to take our turn at saying "This will never do." For as Americans of the current decade, we cannot but be sensitive to the possibilities of a situation like the following. Suppose that during one of the many investigations for subversion that are frequently conducted by legislative committees, some professional informer were to turn on a subject and make the damning accusation:

(6) "Every one of your brothers is a Communist."

Would we not consider that such an accusation, however tiresome, was at least meaningful; and as a meaningful assertion, would it not come under the Law of Excluded Middle? Not only that, but should the accused, in response to the accusation, suddenly become galvanized into action and hurl back at his accuser: "That statement is false! I have no brothers. I was an only child,"—should such a retort be forthcoming, would we not feel that we had been satisfied, not only logically with respect to the Law of Excluded Middle, but perhaps in other ways as well?

Unhappily, though, Strawson and Hart would apparently want to deprive us of at least the logical portion of our satis-

faction. On their analysis, were it the case that the accused had no brothers, then the question of the truth or falsity of (6) would not even arise. But such analysis be hanged: The circumstances being as we have described them, who is there who would not consider the informer to be a liar, and a liar precisely because he had made a patently false statement?

Moreover, the paradoxical and wholly unsatisfactory nature of this part of Strawson and Hart's analysis is revealed not only through concrete examples such as the preceding; but also, as it would seem to us, in the very terms of that analysis itself.[11]

[11] Actually, Strawson's own record in support of his rather strange doctrine has by no means been free from vacillation. Thus even in his earlier writings, he recognizes that although, as he would have it, a proposition which fails in its claim to existential import is not properly speaking to be pronounced false, still one can say that anyone who asserts such a proposition is guilty of a misleading, mistaken, incorrect, or spurious use of that sentence or proposition. (Cf. *Introduction to Logical Theory*, p. 175; "On Referring," pp. 329-331.) And yet, if a person can be said to be mistaken or incorrect in his assertion of a proposition, could it not also be said that what he asserts is false? To us, this distinction between a mistaken assertion of a proposition and a false assertion of a proposition comes very close to being a distinction without a difference.

But that is not all. For in his recent interchange with Sellars [*The Philosophical Review*, LXIII (1954) 197-231], Strawson seems to do no less than concede the very point at issue. Thus on pp. 225-226, *ibid.*, he says that in contrast to his earlier position in which he had insisted that an S-P proposition could be considered neither true nor false, if upon the occasion of its use there just weren't any S's to which the S term might be taken to refer, he is now willing to recognize that "*in certain cases and circumstances* it may be quite natural to assign a truth-value" to such an assertion. Moreover, one specific case and circumstance in which Strawson concedes that this would be natural is precisely that in which the person who asserts the proposition is suspected of lying. Indeed, the very example which Strawson has chosen in illustration of his concession is in all ways similar to the example which we have been exploiting for our own purposes of illustration.

Now with reference to this concession by Strawson, two comments would seem in order. In the first place, to concede that even in a single case a statement may be pronounced false, simply because there is nothing for the subject term to refer to or designate, would seem to involve Strawson in all the usual difficulties in connection with the Square of Opposition. For if an S-P proposition is ever held to be false merely on the ground that there are no S's, would not the contradictory opposite of such a proposition

For as we have seen, Strawson insists that the existence of members of the subject class is a necessary *condition* of the truth of any categorical assertion, although this is by no means a part of what is asserted. Or, as he suggests in another place, that a subject-predicate proposition should be true, "*implies*, in some sense of 'imply'" [12] that the subject class has members. But Strawson then hastens to add that this is "a very special and odd sense of 'imply,'" for if it should be the case that the subject class does not have members, then it does not follow that the proposition in question is false.

have to be considered equally false for the same reason? And yet ironically enough, we thought that it was largely for the purpose of obviating just this difficulty that Strawson took the original position that he did, viz. that propositions whose subject terms referred to nothing at all could be considered as neither true nor false. Apparently, then, what Strawson has rather irritatedly tossed out as but a minor concession turns out to be a total surrender.

In the second place, Strawson would seem to want to minimize the extent of his concession by suggesting that it needs to be made only in those cases where the person who makes the statement is suspected of lying. But we feel that such a restriction is scarcely warranted. After all, it is quite possible that the most honorable of gentlemen, whom we should never suspect of the slightest intent to deceive, might very well make a statement about something when there just wasn't any such thing at all. In such an instance, would we not have to consider that our honored and honorable friend was simply mistaken; and if mistaken, would not his statement be simply false?

Of course, both Strawson and Hart are forever citing examples of S-P statements which one would certainly consider to be mistaken for the reason that there just weren't any such S's, and which nevertheless in ordinary English usage one would probably not actually call false. Nor is this the place to go into a discussion of the current fashion among so many English philosophers of considering the ordinary uses of ordinary language as being the final and ultimate norms in matters of logic. Suffice it merely to say that for our part, and regardless of what may be the current norm of English usage in the matter, we see no reason why a statement that is admittedly mistaken is not to be regarded as simply false—provided, that is, that one can explain how such a possible falsity is compatible with the maintenance of the traditional rules governing opposition. But this last is precisely what we shall undertake to show in section IV of this paper.

[12] "On Referring," *op. cit.*, p. 330.

Now this is indeed a special and odd sense of "imply," since it would seem to entail no less than a rejection of the principle of *modus tollens*. For if it be a prior condition of the truth of a subject-predicate proposition that there be members of the subject class, and if in a given instance it is false that there are members of the subject class, then we must also deny the subject-predicate proposition that is conditional upon this $(p \supset q \cdot \supset \cdot \sim q \supset \sim p)$. But Strawson apparently does not want to concede this. It's as if he were saying that there is a sense of "imply," in which a denial of the consequent does not involve a denial of the antecedent.[18] But this seems almost fantastic.

Nor is this the only disability that afflicts the Square in the new life that Strawson and Hart have bestowed upon it. For the question of the existential import of subject-predicate propositions proves to be embarrassing, not merely on those occasions when, following ordinary use, one wants to pronounce a proposition false because it lacks existential import, but also on those

[18] This is perhaps unfair to Strawson. For he could make rejoinder that what he is contending is not merely that the truth of an S-P proposition presupposes or implies the truth of a proposition asserting that there are S's, but rather that the existence of S's is presupposed or implied by the *truth or falsity* of an S-P proposition. In other words, stated formally his view comes to this: if p is true or false, then q; hence if not q, then p is neither true nor false. But this clearly involves no violation of *modus tollens*.

To which we in turn might make rejoinder that even though by such a device Strawson can perhaps avoid the charge of violating *modus tollens*, he by the very same device exposes himself to the charge of violating the law of excluded middle. Thus even when a man has made a categorical statement, that statement, according to Strawson, will be neither true nor false if it can be shown that there is nothing for the subject term to refer to.

For instance, suppose I declare, "Every case that has come before Judge Jones in the last two months has resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff"; but it so happens that I am mistaken, there having been no cases that have been tried before Judge Jones in the last two months. What would Strawson say to this? Presumably, he would say that my assertion was neither true nor false—though, of course, it was mistaken!

occasions when, following the same use, one wants to call a proposition true despite its lack of "existential" import. Thus what about propositions such as (1) and (2) above? Or what about Hart's favorite example of:

(7) All ogres are wicked.

Now it is one thing to point out that the symbolic logicians got themselves into an utterly untenable position in their attempt to maintain that such propositions were true simply and solely on the ground that the subject-class in each case lacked members. But it is an entirely different thing for these latter day partisans extraordinary of ordinary language to explain on what ground they in turn would consider these propositions to be true. For unquestionably, the subject terms in all these propositions are used referringly. At the same time, for some reason Strawson and Hart shy away from admitting that there are in any sense such things as ogres, or bodies not acted upon by external forces, or even possible trespassers. But if the subject classes in these propositions are null, then it would seem that on Strawson's and Hart's own principles these propositions would have to be regarded not as true, but as neither true nor false. But surely, going by any ordinary use of the word "true," would not one say that a proposition such as (1) is true, and likewise (2) and (7) in the appropriate contexts?[14]

No, there just isn't any doubt about it: however much one would like to see the subject-predicate proposition, as well as the attendant Square, start life anew, they just can't hope to lead

[14] As a matter of fact, Strawson does admit that (1) and (2) are true. (Cf. *Introduction to Logical Theory*, pp. 195 ff). However, he is able to do this only by compromising the subject-predicate character of these statements. We shall have more to say about this later. Cf. *infra* n. 23. Hart, on the other hand, seems unable to make up his mind whether to regard a proposition, such as (7) as neither true or false, as he would have to do on the general principles which he and Strawson prefer, or as true within the realm of discourse, e.g., fairy tales, (cf. *op. cit.*)

an honest existence if they put themselves solely in the care of Strawson and Hart.

Nevertheless, before we turn to the next chapter in the story of the revived Square, it might be well to take stock of just what has been accomplished on the Square's behalf thus far, and of just what has still to be accomplished. So far as achievements go, it would seem that Strawson and Hart have certainly established:

(a) that subject-predicate propositions involve a distinctively referring use of the subject term, and hence cannot be reduced to mere existence propositions;
(b) that subject-predicate propositions, even though the existence of members in the subject class is a condition of their truth, still are not themselves assertions of such existence, and hence are not exponible.

On the other hand, it still remains to be shown:

(c) how subject-predicate propositions may be considered false when there are no real referents for the subject, without thereby disrupting all the relations in the Square;
(d) how subject-predicate propositions may be considered true, even though the referents of the subject term are mere fictions or mere possibles with no existence *in rerum natura* at all.

Now it is our contention that both (c) and (d) can be accomplished without too much difficulty. And yet before turning to our own proposals in this regard, we must first take brief cognizance of still another recent attempt at restoring the Square.

III

Geographically, the recent fashion of reviving the Square has not been confined just to England, but has even had a couple of scattered partisans in the logical wilderness that is the United States. And although these American defenders of the Square have differed from each other in rather significant respects, the

interesting thing is that they have both differed from what Strawson and Hart were saying.

For instance, Thompson [15] seems quite willing to go along with the partisans of ordinary language in maintaining the integrity of the categorical proposition against either exponentiation or reduction to existence-propositions [points (a) and (b) above]. But in sharp opposition to Strawson and Hart, Thompson is very scornful of the thesis that categorical propositions are neither true nor false when their subjects have no referents. As Thompson points out, this violates the Law of Excluded Middle. And not only is such a course utterly indefensible; it is also unnecessary. For it is neither to the symbolic logicians nor to the partisans of ordinary language that one needs to go for a right understanding of existential import, but simply to Aristotle—at least so thinks Thompson. Moody, on the other hand, finds his defense of the Square in the logic of medieval Aristotelians. But unlike both the ordinary language partisans and Thompson, Moody has no objection to exponentiation; in fact, he presents his defense of the Square in the language and symbolism of its modern opponents.[16]

But both Thompson and Moody agree on the general thesis by which they defend the Square. Briefly, their thesis is this: existential import is neither something that should be ascribed to particular propositions and withheld from universals, as the

[15] Cf. "On Aristotle's Square of Opposition." *The Philosophical Review*, LXII (1953). Also "Reply to Mr. Nelson," *ibid.*, LXIII (1954).

[16] Cf. *Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic* (Amsterdam, 1953) pp. 49-53. Moody undertakes to defend the Square by what Strawson would call an "*ad hoc* patching up of the old system in order to represent it, in its entirety, as a fragment of the new." (*Introduction*, p. 171). At the same time, it should be noted that this may not reflect Moody's own convictions as much as it reflects the peculiar exigencies of the task which he has set for himself. For in his book his intention seems to be to try to make the achievements of medieval logic intelligible to modern logicians by translating the former, so far as possible, into the symbolism of the latter.

symbolic logicians maintain, nor something that is a pre-condition of the use of any and all of the four types, as Strawson insists; instead, it is something that is characteristic of affirmative propositions but not of negatives.

Specifically, it is with respect to point (c) above, that the Moody-Thompson account of the Square shows itself to best advantage. By way of illustration, suppose that we reconsider the assertion of proposition (6) under the circumstances described above. As we saw, with respect to such an assertion Strawson and Hart would be put in the untenable position of having to say that it was not false, but rather neither true nor false. But not so Thompson and Moody: they would be quite ready to pronounce (6) false. Nor will they be embarrassed by the difficulty which Strawson and Hart were trying to avoid—the difficulty, viz., of having to recognize that if an A proposition be considered false on the ground that its supposed referents turn out to be nonexistent, then its contradictory opposite must also be considered false for the same reason. Thus on the Moody-Thompson view the contradictory of (6) would be:

(6.1) Not every one of your brothers is a Communist.

This neither asserts, nor even presupposes, as a pre-condition of its truth, that there are any brothers of the individual in question. Instead, (6.1) is to be interpreted as simply negating the corresponding A proposition (viz. (6)).

Or stated less ambiguously, Thompson's and Moody's insistence that negative propositions are without existential import really involves a rather peculiar understanding of negation and denial. On their view a negative proposition is not to be regarded as denying something (a predicate) of something else (a subject), or as asserting that a given thing or entity (the subject) is not something else (the predicate). Instead, the

negative proposition is to be interpreted merely as denying, in the sense of putting a "not" in front of, the corresponding affirmative.[17]

Clearly, then, on the basis of such an interpretation of negation and negative propositions, Moody and Thompson can deal with (c) quite satisfactorily: it is perfectly possible to deny an affirmative proposition, on the ground that its subject term lacks referents, without in any wise being committed to a denial of its contradictory at the same time and for the same reason.[18]

[17] Nelson in his discussion of Thompson's article, seems concerned to make somewhat the same point: "Thus, 'No men are just' does not affirm anything; it operates merely as denying the affirmation, 'Some men are just'" V. "In Defense of the Traditional Interpretation of the Square," *The Philosophical Review*, LXIII (1954) 402.

[18] But granted that both the law of excluded middle and the relations of the Square now remain intact, do Moody and Thompson still give us the basic simple categorical propositions of the Aristotelian Square? For as Moody's account shows, when existential import is attributed to affirmatives as opposed to negatives, the A and the O can only be expressed *in modern quantificational symbolism* as a conjunction and a disjunction. But if this revitalized Square relates compound propositions, it is obviously what it claims to be: a scheme of basic propositional opposition. Thompson, on the other hand, fully recognizes this difficulty and refuses to state his interpretation of the Square in the modern form. Can he get away with it? For it would seem that the ordinary-language people can avoid exponentiation precisely because they consider only one truth condition, namely predication, to apply directly to the categorical propositions of the Square. But as soon as we introduce existential import into the Square, it would seem that either the relations between propositions fail or we do not have an opposition of simple propositions, and in either case, we do not have the Square of Opposition.

Since this is a criticism which symbolic logicians would be likely to raise against Thompson, let us address ourselves primarily to them. If Thompson must state his A and O as conjunction and disjunction, then symbolic logicians also must expone their A and E as compound propositions. For exactly the same type of contrast which Thompson claims between affirmatives and negatives is claimed by the symbolic logician to hold between universals and particulars. Let us, for brevity's sake consider merely the universals, which would have to be considered as compound propositions by the symbolic logician, provided his criticism of Thompson were legitimate. Since on the symbolic analysis the A and E are true on

All this sounds fine. There is only one slight drawback:[19] is Thompson's and Moody's (and allegedly Aristotle's) notion of negation and negative propositions a defensible one? Do we actually use negative propositions in this way? Unfortunately, we are inclined to think not. And to bring our disagreement to a head, suppose we recall to mind once again the circumstances attendant upon the assertion of proposition (6) above. Only this time, let it be supposed that the paid informer makes a slightly different accusation, in his effort at incrimination by blood relationship:

(8) "None of your brothers has been able to clear himself of charges of subversion."

Once again, could not the accused win our logical, as well perhaps as our moral, approbation by emphatically declaring

either of two grounds, that there are no S's or that there are S's but the predicate does not apply, they should be written as:

(7) Either there are f's and for all x, if it's an f, it's a g: or, there are no f's. $[(Ex)\,fx.\,(x)\,(fx \supset gx)] \vee -(Ex)\,fx$

(8) Either there are f's and for all x, if it's an f, it's not a g: or, there are no f's. $[(Ex)\,fx.\,(x)\,fx \supset -gx)] \vee -(Ex)\,fx$

But, the symbolic logician is likely to protest: "The advantage of my symbolism is precisely that both truth-satisfying conditions can be taken care of by a simple denial (of the corresponding particular), whereas for Thompson they cannot be taken care of without making the A into a conjunction, the O, a disjunction." This is true enough. However, the reason Thompson cannot is that the mathematical logician's symbolism already has illegitimately prejudged the matter. Naturally, if the particular quantifier carries existential import, Thompson's O must be represented by adding a disjunctive denial of existence. Similarly, if the universal quantifier carries no existential import as applied to the A, a conjunctive affirmation of existential import must be added. It is significant, as Thompson points out *op. cit.* (p. 265) that the symbolic analysis, in destroying the copula, has no way of expressing the difference between negative and affirmative propositions, which of course is a distinction essential to his account of the Square.

[19] There are, of course, other drawbacks as well. Indeed, Thompson himself recognizes that on his interpretation of negative propositions certain restrictions must be placed on immediate inferences by obversion and contraposition. This question, however, is not relevant to our main concern in this paper.

such an accusation to be false,—and false simply on the ground that, being an only child, he has no brother at all?

But unfortunately, on Thompson's and Moody's analysis, proposition (8), being negative, is without existential import; hence it could not be considered false on the ground that the subject term lacked referents. Quite the contrary, Thompson and Moody would have no alternative but to regard (8) as true,[20] since they have already ruled out the alternative proposal by Strawson and Hart, according to which an assertion such as (8) could be considered entirely meaningful and yet at the same time neither true nor false.

Reluctantly, then, we must conclude that the Thompson-Moody-Aristotle(?) proposals for dealing with the issue of (c) above must be written off as a noble, but unsuccessful effort. Not only that, but so far as (d) is concerned, it would seem that Thompson fumbles almost as badly as do Strawson and Hart. It's true that in his article Thompson's primary concern is to show how it is possible to consider an affirmative proposition as being false when its subject term lacks referents; hence it is perhaps only to be expected that he should not recognize the problem of how it is possible to regard a universal affirmative proposition as being true, despite the fact that its subject lacks referents. Nevertheless, it is a question of equal importance in deciding the fate of the Square.[21]

[20] This may be very unfair to Thompson. It is quite possible that he would regard an assertion such as (8) as exponible, in which case the conjunction of (8) as it stands, with an assertion to the effect that the man has brothers, could, of course, be considered false. But this would seem rather seriously to compromise the general principle on which Thompson would appear to be operating with respect to categorical propositions—the principle, namely, that the truth conditions of a proposition are not to be confused with what the proposition itself actually asserts.

[21] In the Moody-Thompson theory there is nothing incompatible with a wide sense of being which would include ogres, numbers, geometrical points, circles, etc. Moody, as a matter of fact, plainly indicates (*op. cit.*, p. 57) the wide sense in which existential import is to be taken for affirmatives.

IV

Apparently from the present look of things, the poor Square is in a curious predicament. It does not lack for eager revivers, but while its champions have been able to give the Square a renewed right to life, they seem not to have been so successful in bestowing upon it the accompanying rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. For there is no denying the fact, the Square's current mode of life is seriously afflicted with compromise and embarrassment.

Perhaps, though, not too much is wanting to clear the Square's name completely. Indeed, unless we are very much mistaken, the means are already at hand, if only they can be organized and brought together. For it's as if the various groups of thinkers who have thus far concerned themselves with the status of the Square—the symbolic logicians, the partisans of ordinary language, and the latter-day, self-styled Aristotelians—had each of them fixed upon certain exigencies of logical or linguistic use and then had either forgotten or tried to explain away the other equally necessary uses.

Thus the symbolic logicians quite correctly recognized the opposition of so-called existence propositions to be a distinctive and legitimate type of opposition. But unhappily they combined this very proper insight with a very improper and highhanded attempt to constitute such existential opposition the only type of opposition and to rule out oppositions between subject-predicate propositions altogether. Fortunately, though, Strawson and Hart have quite redressed the balance again in this regard.

Yet they, in turn, have proved to be almost equally arbitrary

But Thompson apparently wants to limit *being* to existence *in rerum natura*. Consequently he appears to be open to Nelson's charge that because he would regard such a proposition as "All ogres are wicked" as false and its contrary, "No ogres are wicked" as true, his analysis is just as arbitrary as the symbolic logician's. (Cf. Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 405, 411-412).

about certain other uses. For it does seem to be the case that we frequently have occasion to deny a categorical proposition simply because the subject term lacks referents, and just as frequently, to consider as true certain categorical propositions whose referents could not possibly be said to exist *in rerum natura*. But not knowing quite how to deal with such uses, Strawson and Hart appear to have resorted to the dubious practice of simply denying such uses to be legitimate.

Likewise, Thompson and Moody would appear to have fixed upon an interesting, but somewhat neglected, use of negation, in which we quite properly deny a categorical proposition, but we do so in an unspecified way. That is to say, our denial does not specify whether we are challenging the existential import, which is a condition of the truth of the categorical assertion, or the predicative import of the proposition, which is the very thing the proposition as such asserts.

But again, this recognition of a proper use is marred by the somewhat doctrinaire insistence that this particular use is the only use. Specifically in Thompson's case, this rather peculiar use is foisted upon the Square, with the contention that oppositions of quality in the Square involve this one use of negation and no other.

Turning now to our own recommendation of tolerance with respect to all these uses, let us see if we cannot demonstrate just how such a policy of tolerance may in fact be carried out. First, our contention against Strawson and Hart has been that it is simply a fact of logical or linguistic use that we frequently deny a subject-predicate proposition, not because the predicate fails to pertain to the subject, but rather because the subject is nonexistent—or better, because there just are not any referents for the subject to refer to. How, though, can this use be recognized without completely disrupting the relations of the Square? Strawson and Hart seem to feel that such a thing is impossible.

In consequence, rather than discard the Square, they prefer to deny this particular use and to say that in all such cases the proposition is not so much false, as neither true nor false.

However, so to resort to the extreme of denying the Law of Excluded Middle would seem scarcely necessary. For why, instead of insisting that in such a case the question of the truth or falsity of the assertion does not arise, could we not rather say merely that the question of relations in the Square does not arise? The reason for doing so is simple. Whenever one denies a categorical proposition on the ground that its subject lacks referents, the relations of opposition that therewith come into play would seem to be not the relations of the Square at all, but rather those relations of opposition which, as we saw earlier, hold between existence propositions, and which the symbolic logicians have done so much to focus attention upon.

For instance, suppose one has a simple A proposition of the form. 'Every S is P'; and suppose that one wishes to deny this on the ground that there are no S's at all. Following the analysis suggested earlier, we may say that it is a pre-condition of the A proposition's truth that there be S's. By hypothesis, however, there are no S's. In other words, involved here is a simple opposition between existence propositions:

There are S's. (F)
There are no S's. (T)

Moreover, since the truth of 'There are S's' is a condition of the truth of 'Every S is P,' the falsity of the former will certainly involve the falsity of the latter.

Nor are we thereby committed to admitting the truth of 'Some S's are not P's,' as would be necessary if the relations in the Square were here pertinent. For to judge by ordinary use, as soon as a categorical proposition is denied on the ground that there is nothing for the subject to refer to, one just never thinks

of the relations in the Square as coming into play at all. For example, when the accused denounces as a lie the statement,

(6) "Every one of your brothers is a Communist,"

and does so on the ground that he is an only child, it would surely strike anyone as being no less than a linguistic or logical malaprop to insist that the accused had thereby committed himself to acknowledging the truth of the assertion:

(6.1) "Some one of my brothers at least is not Communist."

In other words, the principle that underlies such a use would seem to be simply this: not only is the existence of S's a precondition of the truth of any categorical proposition; in addition, it is a condition that must be met before the customary relations of opposition between categorical propositions become relevant at all.

But at this point, someone is likely to counter with the objection: "Are not you, in turn, playing fast and loose with the Law of Excluded Middle, quite as much as Strawson and Hart? Indeed, they did no more than insist that on certain occasions a categorical assertion might be neither true nor false, whereas you go much further and say that upon occasion an A proposition, for example, might be false, without the corresponding O proposition necessarily being true."

To this, our reply would be that it is precisely in this context that the particular use in regard to negation and denial that Thompson has singled out has its proper relevance. For any categorical assertion the Law of Excluded Middle holds: the assertion is either true or false. Nevertheless, on the alternative of negating or denying or considering such an assertion to be false, we do not necessarily have to consider that our denial involves an actual denial of a predicate of the given (and hence presumably existent) subject. No, such a denial, so to speak, merely puts a negation sign or an 'it-is-false-that' in front of

the corresponding affirmative. And what is involved in such a use is nothing more nor less than a sort of generalized or unspecified Excluded Middle, in which we do not make determinate or explicit whether we are denying the assertion on the grounds of its existential import or on the ground of its predicative import.[22]

But once we make explicit that our denial of the assertion is made, say, on the basis that the predicate does not pertain to the subject, then the relations of the Square and the specific type of Excluded Middle contained therein—, as between A's and O's and between E's and I's—immediately become pertinent. On the other hand, should we make explicit that our denial is made solely on the basis of there being no referents for the subject term, then we are really denying a pre-condition of the truth of the assertion. But in such a case the relevant relation of opposition is merely an opposition between existence propositions—'Either there are S's or there aren't'—and the relations of the Square do not enter the picture at all.

So much, then, for our suggestions as to how issue (c) of Part II above can be most adequately dealt with. But what now about (d)? For in (c) the problem was one of explaining how it is possible to deny categorical assertions of any of the four forms on the ground that their subjects lack referents. In

[22] In answer to the possible objection that we would have to consider every proposition as exponible into two assertions, we would present the same considerations as we have done in defense of Thompson. (Cf. note 18).

Incidentally, it might be remarked that in subscribing to the view here advocated, one of the authors, Mr. Veatch, is forced to repudiate his earlier suggestions (v. his *Intentional Logic* (New Haven, 1952), pp. 249-263) as to how the traditional square might be salvaged. These earlier suggestions were designed to show that regardless of whether a proposition were declared false because its subject term did not refer to anything, or because its predicate term did not apply to the subject, in either or both cases all of the traditional relations of the Square would remain intact. Such a view, however, we are now convinced is a serious oversimplification and really indefensible. Mr. Veatch is particularly indebted to Monsignor Doyle's criticisms for shedding much light on this question.

(d), on the other hand, the problem is to explain how such assertions may upon occasion be affirmed as true even when their subjects appear to lack referents. In both cases it is ordinary use which would seem to support the respective denials and the affirmations. Likewise, in both cases it is the resulting relationships in the Square that would appear to cause all the difficulty.

For instance, as regards the second issue, that of (d), it would seem to be the relation of subalternation, rather than that of contradiction, that brings the issue to a head. Thus in the case of statements like (1), (2) and (7) above, it would appear that in ordinary use we should certainly regard these as being true. And yet at the same time, we apparently cannot help shying away from concluding that their subalterns are also true:

(1.1) Many a body that is not moved by an external force continues etc.

(2.1) Some trespassers will be prosecuted.

(7.1) Many an ogre is wicked.

How then, is this issue to be met? First, we suggest that there is no need to compromise that basic principle which the ordinary-language people have insisted upon and which would certainly seem to be basic to any right understanding of the nature of categorical assertion. That principle is that the existence of referents for the subject term is a pre-condition of the truth of any categorical assertion. Nevertheless, such an assertion of principle we should immediately like to follow up with an insistence upon a very broad construction of the requirement that referents for the subject term must be or exist.[23]

[23] It is our contention that it is precisely his failure to recognize that *being* may be said in many ways that has led Strawson (*Introduction to Logical Theory*, Ch. VII) to what in our eyes is a rather farfetched treatment of (1) and (2). Thus (2) he considers to be not a categorical proposition, but rather a "threat." (Incidentally why is it not possible for a threat to be a categorical proposition?). And (1) he would apparently regard as a conditional statement, the truth of which is recognizable only in so far as it seems to be "a part of a wider theory." In other words,

Of course, no sooner do we say this much than the iniquities of Meinong will immediately be visited upon our heads and our proposals will be summarily dismissed as involving "a failure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies." [24] Nonetheless, in self-defense we hasten to appeal to the celebrated Aristotelian dictum that *being* is said in many different ways. Now without necessarily suggesting what Aristotle himself may have meant by this, it would certainly seem that a very plausible and fruitful meaning can be given to the dictum. For surely, some things are spoken of as *being* merely in the sense that they are able to be; others in the sense that they are being imagined or thought about. Nor does this in any sense imply that there is an actually existing realm of possibles and another actually existing universe of fictions or beings of reason. On the contrary, possibles are, not as actually being, but only as able to be; and beings of reason do not exist in themselves, but only in thought and in imagination.

Indeed, so far as the ordinary use of language is concerned, it would seem that no one hesitates to talk about things as being in many other senses than the obvious sense of being in the space-time of the natural world. Rather in ordinary language the concern is not that of restricting being to just one univocal sense, but rather that of guarding against confusion of the senses of being, e. g. of fact with fiction, of possible with actual, *etc.*

For instance, suppose that a comfortable, well-fed, well-edu-

Strawson insists that neither (1) nor (2) is a subject-predicate proposition. This conclusion, however, seems to us to be both unwarranted and unnecessary. It is unwarranted because to regard (1) and (2) as subject-predicate propositions would seem to be quite the most natural and ordinary way of taking them. Moreover, it is unnecessary, simply because the minute one recognizes that *being* may be said in many ways, then it becomes immediately apparent how the subject classes of (1) and (2) (and (7) also, for that matter), can have members. (Cf. supra, note 14).

[24] B. Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (London, 1920) p. 169.

cated citizen should give himself over to a bit of romancing and should declare:

(8) "All sea-serpents live in the sea."

Catching the mood and sensing the context, we should no doubt agree and should unhesitatingly say that (8) was true. Nor would it occur to us that in the context there would be anything unacceptable about the subaltern either:

(8.1) "Many a sea-serpent lives in the sea."

On the other hand, and by way of contrast, suppose that the person asserting (8), instead of being the model of bourgeois enlightenment that we have just imagined, were rather a strange crank who was actually under the illusion that there were such things as sea-serpents *in rerum natura*. Under these circumstances, we should certainly say that (8) was false. Moreover, in accordance with our earlier suggestions, a denial of (8) under these circumstances would really involve a denial of the existence proposition that is a condition of the truth of (8). In consequence, the regular relations of the Square of Opposition just would not come into play in such a case.

In other words, the point of our illustrations is simply to bring out the fact that categorical assertions about purely fictional or hypothetical entities occasion not the slightest difficulty in ordinary use.[25] Not only that, but inferences from the

[25] If we mistake not, our position in this regard is not unlike that taken by Nelson in his discussion with Thompson (*op. cit.*, pp. 406-409). The principal difference would seem to be that Nelson would restrict existence and existential import entirely to the natural world, propositions about fictions, mere possibles, etc. being in a different "realm of discourse." On the other hand, we should prefer to take *being* and existence not univocally, but analogously, and hence to say that any and all discourse is perforce about things that may be said to be, though not always in the same sense of "to be."

To many, of course, it may still seem that a theory of this latter type leads to the hopeless predicament of one's not being able ever to say of anything that it does not exist. However, this predicament is really

truth of a universal to that of its subaltern occasion no difficulty either, *provided only* that in passing from the A to the I or from the E to the O, there is no change in the existential status of the referents.[26]

Indeed, we suggest that this is precisely the cause of the difficulty that anyone seems to experience in passing from (1) to (1.1) or from (2) to (2.1). Thus (1) and (2) are obviously about purely hypothetical cases and entities, whereas (1.1) and (2.1) are so worded that we inevitably interpret them as referring to, or being about, actual things and entities in the real world. Little wonder, then, that we should unhesitatingly declare (1.1) and (2.1) to be false, just as we should also unhesitately declare a proposition like (8) to be false, the minute we should become convinced that the user of such a proposition meant to refer to real entities *in rerum natura*.

But suppose that we worded the subalterns of (1) and (2) somewhat differently. Since (2) is really an assertion not about actual trespassers, but only about such possible trespassers as may happen to be caught, then it would certainly seem that if

gratuitous and arises simply from a failure to recognize that there are different senses in which things may be said to be. To recognize this fact is not to commit oneself to the view that there is a whole menagerie composed of sea-serpents, unicorns, ogres, or present kings of France which subsist or occupy some "timeless realm" or Platonic heaven. But to say "Sea-serpents do not exist" or "There are no such things as sea-serpents" certainly does not mean that sea-serpents are not such things as can even be talked about or referred to in any sense. On the contrary, they *are* precisely in the sense of being imagined and being talked about, but they *are not* in the sense of being *in rerum natura*.

Upon recognition of the analogous character of being, the elaborate analytic mechanism formulated by symbolic logicians especially to take care of the seeming absurdities of existential commitment is rendered completely unnnecessary. At the same time the distinction between the old style existence proposition and the existential statement as product of such analysis, is rendered unnecessary. (Cf. note 5).

[26] An excellent article dealing with this very matter has recently been published by John J. Morrison, entitled "The Existential Import of a Proposition in Aristotelian Logic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XV (1955) 386-393.

all such trespassers as may happen to be caught will be prosecuted, then it must needs be the case too that:

(2.2) At least some of those trespassers who may happen to get caught will be prosecuted.

In this latter case, there is clearly no change in the existential status of the entities referred to in (2.2) and those referred to in (2). Hence we should not hesitate to declare (2.2) true, if (2) is true—unless, that is, our understanding of language had been hopelessly corrupted by the dogmatic pronouncements of the symbolic logicians to the effect that only particular propositions have existential import and that such import is restricted solely to actual existents *in rerum natura*.

And so likewise in the case of (1). Since what we are talking about there are purely hypothetical or imaginary bodies which are so conceived that we may say of them what one can never say of actual bodies in the real world, then one must so word the subaltern of (1) as to make sure that one is referring to exactly the same kind of things, existing only under the same hypothetical conditions. For example,

(2.2) At least some of those purely hypothetical bodies, which are conceived of as not being moved by any external forces at all, will continue (i. e. must also be conceived as continuing) in a state of uniform rest or motion.

To sum up, then, it would seem that if we are careful not only about the precise meanings of words, but also about the precise ways in which they are used to refer to existent entities, then there need be no difficulty either about assertions about purely fictional or hypothetical entities or about the consequent relations of opposition between such assertions as these are set forth in the Square.

Why not concede to the Square, then, the right not only to live, but to live happily ever after?

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God and the Good in Plato

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PLATO'S APPROACH to the existence of God, as Solmsen points out, is manifold.[1] The radical problem of being and becoming, the poles of Platonic thought, leads to a philosophy of movement in which an eternal and self-moving being is seen as the source of all movement and life.[2] The manifest order in the cosmos, both in the macrocosm and the microcosmic world of man, marks the teleological and providential approach of the *Timaeus* and *Laws*.[3] Again, in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedo* the influence of the Orphic mysteries seen in the eschatological myths may be regarded as "a well-founded assumption."[4] Underlying these three approaches, however, and fundamental to all Platonic educational and political thought, is the expurgatory reform of traditional Greek theology inherited from Homer, which distinguishes the revolutionary themes of the *Republic*.[5]

The reason for the severe strictures on conventional mythology and religion is rooted in the centrality of *paradeigma* and *mimesis*, the model and its imitation, in the Platonic ideal of education.[6] The typical actions of the Homeric pantheon were often invoked to justify the violence, deceit, and lust of

[1] F. Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1942) vii-viii. Cf. E. Frank, *American Journal of Philology*, LXVI (1945) 92-96.

[2] Solmsen, pp. 75-79, 138: "In justifying Soul as the prime mover Plato relies on its identity with the principle of life, pointing out that wherever we see life we say that Soul is present and operating; when he emphasizes its responsibility for the orderly and harmonious nature of the world, he makes use of the close association between ψυχή and νοῦς."

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-119.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 63-74.

[6] W. Jaeger, *Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, In Search of the Divine Centre*, trans. G. Highet (New York, 1943) II, 259.

later Greeks. Obviously, if ever an ideal state was to be approximated, Plato saw that the religious ideals of the populace had to be purified, and the model for their imitation freed from all anthropomorphic stains. Thus in the second book of the *Republic*,[7] Plato asserted the basic proposition that God is good in reality and is to be so represented by the poets, that he is not the cause of evil, but only of good, and therefore if human sufferings are referred to God, it must be noted that they are inflicted for the good of the victim.[8] The divine attributes of goodness and truthfulness[9] also involved for Plato the fact that God is immutable, simple,[10] and personally provident.[11] In a celebrated passage in the *Theaetetus*, Plato formulated the relationship that should exist between men and God: "Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like

[7] Plato, *Republic*, 379 B.

[8] Cf. J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, I (Cambridge, 1926) I, 117-118; "An earlier generation looked on punishment as retributory. . . . Traces of a milder theory were however contained in the doctrine *τὰθος μάθος*. . . . In Plato punishment is remedial. Ignorance or vice is, in the soul, what disease is in the body. . . . The punishment, again, which awaits the wicked after death is intended to cure their souls, unless they are incurable . . .: so that in its deepest relations this doctrine reaches to the very roots of Plato's philosophy." Moreover, Plato admits only the free will of the agent as the author of moral evil; a line often quoted by the Church Fathers on this point is found in *Rep.* 617 E: "the responsibility is with the chooser; God is justified." The view of Plutarch that Plato holds for an evil world-soul, renewed by Zeller, is firmly opposed by A. Taylor, *Plato, The Man and His Work*, 3rd ed. rev. (London, 1929) p. 491. Cf. Jaeger, pp. 218-9.

[9] Plato, *Republic*, 380 D.

[10] Cf. Adam, Vol. III, p. 104.

[11] This last attribute especially distinguishes Plato's God from Aristotle's in *Laws* 885 C and 735 E, Plato decrees banishment for anyone who dares to deny God's personal providence over men, which Plato regarded as the bedrock of obligation, but Aristotle's Prime Mover can exercise no personal providence because it has no knowledge of material beings, neither is it the source of perfect moral obligation, nor the object of cultus as in Plato (but cf. *Pol.* 1329^a 26-34); its entire *raison d'être* is cosmological (*Meta.* 1074^b 15-1075^a 11).

God; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise." [12]

At the same time that this purification of traditional theology was undertaken, the idea of the Good was also presented in perhaps the most commented passage of all the Platonic writings.[13] It is the objective of this study briefly to consider some of the main arguments in favor of and in opposition to the identification of the idea of the Good with the Platonic God. Prescinding from the testimony of antiquity, one may find in modern scholarship considerable support for this identification. The most prominent advocates include Zeller,[14] Jowett,[15] Adam,[16] Wilamowitz,[17] Friedländer,[18] Lodge,[19] Ritter,[20] Festugière,[21] Hardie,[22] Robin,[23] Pacheco,[24] Jaeger,[25] and Frank.[26] The adversaries of this theory declare that Plato's God as a soul cannot be equated with the idea of the Good; this view

[12] *Theaetetus*, 176 A.

[13] *Republic*, 508 D-509 C.

[14] E. Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy*, trans. Alleyne and Goodwin (London, 1888) p. 282.

[15] B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato* (Oxford, 1892) III, xcviii.

[16] J. Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece* (Edinburgh, 1908) p. 442. Cf. *The Republic of Plato*, II, 58; commenting on 508 A, he says: "Plato's description of the sun is instinct with religious feeling. The 'clear god and patron of all light, from whom each lamp and shining star doth borrow the beautiful influence that makes him bright' claims adoration from Plato not merely as οὐράνιοι θεοί like other stars, but as the symbol and scion (ἔγκονοι) of the *Supreme Idea or God*."

[17] U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Plato* (Berlin, 1920) I, 589.

[18] P. Friedländer, *Platon* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1928) I, 72.

[19] R. Lodge, *Plato's Theory of Ethics* (New York, 1928) pp. 171, 466 ff.

[20] C. Ritter, *The Essence of Plato's Philosophy*, trans. Alles (New York, 1933) pp. 130, 375.

[21] A. Festugière, O. P., *Contemplation et Vie Contemplative selon Platon* (Paris, 1936) pp. 264-266.

[22] W. Hardie, *A Study in Plato* (Oxford, 1936) p. 156.

[23] L. Robin, *Platon* (Paris, 1938) p. 259 f.

[24] A. Pacheco, *Plato's Conception of Love* (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1942) pp. 70-83. Pacheco also identifies the Demiurge of the *Timaeus* with the Good and God.

[25] Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 285 f.; p. 415, n. 39.

[26] E. Frank, *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945) 92-96; cf. n. 1.

under various forms is held by Shorey,[27] Bovet,[28] Raeder,[29] Steward,[30] Burnet,[31] More,[32] Grube,[33] Taylor,[34] Cornford,[35]

[27] P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1934) p. 230. Also, "The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic," *Univ. of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology* (1895) 239. Cf. Adam, *op. cit.*, II, 172.

[28] P. Bovet, *Le Dieu de Platon* (a Geneva dissertation, 1902) referred to by Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 415.

[29] H. Raeder, *Platons Philosophische Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1905) p. 381.

[30] Steward, *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas* (Oxford, 1909) pp. 53, 59. Together with Ritter, Lutoslawski, and Pacheco, Steward holds that the Ideas are existent only in the mind of Plato's God. Cf. Rutenber, *The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato* (New York, 1946) p. 33.

[31] J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (London, 1928) p. 337.

[32] P. More, *The Religion of Plato* (Princeton, 1921) pp. 312-4.

[33] G. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (London, 1935) p. 152.

[34] A. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

[35] F. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (New York, 1935) p. 245 ff. *Plato's Cosmology* (New York, 1937) pp. 34-35: warning against Taylor's interpretation of the Demiurge as being self-diffusing in his goodness, Cornford remarks: "There is, in the first place, no justification for the suggestion, conveyed by 'God' with a capital letter, that Plato was a monotheist. He believed in the divinity of the world as a whole and the heavenly bodies. The *Epinomis* recommends the institution of a cult of these celestial gods. . . . Still less is there the slightest warrant in Greek thought of the pre-Christian centuries for the notion of 'overflowing love,' or love of any kind, prompting a good to make a world. It is not fair either to Plato or to the New Testament to ascribe the most characteristic revelations of the founder of Christianity to a pagan polytheist."

Two observations may be made on these statements. First of all, Plato is not *simply* a polytheist. Solmsen, who opposes the identification of God and Good as strongly as does Cornford, affirms: ". . . this line of thought, if carried to its logical conclusion, would lead beyond common Greek polytheism to a monotheistic position. Plato repeatedly glides from the plural of the word 'god' into the singular" (p. 70). Burnet is much stronger: "It cannot be doubted that Plato *personally* believed in one God." (*Platonism* [Berkeley, 1928] p. 118, italics mine.) In a controversy on this point with Cornford, Taylor claims that Plato was a monotheist on St. Thomas' definition of monotheism as belief in the supremacy of one being endowed with intelligence and will over all lesser beings. ("'The 'Polytheism' of Plato: An Apologia," *Mind*, XLVII [1938] 182). Cf. Rutenber, *op. cit.*, p. 16. The point to be stressed is not whether Plato recognized a plurality of gods, a point that seemed quite indifferent to the Greeks, but whether he recognized one God as supreme over the others, as seems quite tenable from *Rep.* 382 D, 597 C; *Laws* 913 D.

Secondly, it seems quite probable to hold that the axiom: *bonum est*

Demos,[36] Solmsen,[37] Gilson,[38] Rutenber,[39] Ross,[40] and Cherniss.[41] The conciliating attempt of Diès would require a complete

diffusivum sui is found seminally in the very passage on which Cornford comments (*Tim.* 29 E-30): "He was good and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy he desired that all things should be *like himself* as far as possible. . . . God desired that all things should be good, and nothing bad, as far as possible." In this celebrated passage, Plato acquits the Demiurge of an acquisitive desire in 'shaping' the world according to the Ideas, and motivates him with a pure desire to communicate his own goodness which he possesses without blemish; it is a motive that St. Thomas would assert: *Summa Theol.*, I, 44, 4. Cf. P. Donnelly, S. J., "St. Thomas and the Ultimate Purpose of Creation," *Theological Studies*, II (1941) 53-85. A cautious theologian may perhaps find some note of moral necessity in the cited passage on the Demiurge's action on the grounds that his goodness would be limited, were he not to share it as far as possible. Also, "L'axiome 'Bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le néo-platonisme et le thomisme," by J. Peghaire, *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, Sect. spec., I (1932) 5-30. It is interesting to note that Aristotle never comments on this passage which seems to serve as a nexus between the formal Ideas and the efficient Demiurge; and if the Ideas are extrinsic to the Demiurge it must be asked why Plato claims that even though the Ideas are the exemplars, still the world is made to the *likeness of the Demiurge*.

[36] R. Demos, *The Philosophy of Plato* (New York, 1939) pp. 10, 64, 123.

[37] Solmsen, op. cit., pp. 72, 92.

[38] E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven, 1941) p. 25 ff. Cf. *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. Downes, 3rd ed. (New York, 1940) pp. 437-8.

[39] Rutenber, *op. cit.*, p. 34 f. presents perhaps the best summary analysis of the major authorities on either side of this controversy. His own conclusion on this issue is quote-worthy: "God, the divine soul, differs not in kind but in degree only from human souls. . . . He, too, is energized by a perfect contemplation of the realm of forms, which includes a form of life. Participation in this form of life or motion constitutes God an eternal living soul. God's very being as a self-mover is maintained by this participation. . . . The essence of God is *nous*, so his essential being is thinking being and his essential motion is thought. . . . He thinks the forms and thinks them truly because he thinks them as they really are. The goodness of God . . . is derivative from the wisdom which the intuition of the forms gives him. The form of the Good is the light by which he 'sees,' since the Good is the cause of the intelligibility of the forms, but it is also the complete content of God's mind since the Good is that which gives to the forms their being."

While this seems an excellent analysis of Plato's thought in some respects, yet in others there are elements of antinomy. 1) To say that a self-moved mover participates in the form of motion or life is really to say

study by itself for adequate analysis.[42] From this array of authorities, Jaeger and Festugière will be selected to defend

that *it is moved by this form*; only the original form, the source of participation, would then be unmoved by another; but since Plato declares that his God as prime mover is unmoved by another, it cannot possibly share in this form itself. 2) God certainly differs from human souls by his entire being if his essential activity is thought; if his very *esse* is *intelligere*, then the motion predicated of him, the κίνησις νοῦ is the Thomistic *actus perfecti* in which there is no transit from potency to act, but pure act itself; thus in *Summa Theol.*, I, 9, 1, ad 1: "Augustine there speaks of the motion by which Plato used to say that the prime mover moved itself, when he calls every operation a motion, according to which even to understand and to will and to love are called types of motion." If these two points are true, the goodness of Plato's God is pure and underived.

[40] D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford, 1951) p. 43: "It would be truer to say two things: First, that while any Idea, and therefore the Idea of good, is for Plato always a universal, a nature, wherever he speaks of God he means a being having a nature, and in particular not goodness but a supremely good being. . . . Again in the early part of the *Republic*, where Plato maintains that the citizens of the ideal state must be taught that God is good (379 B 1), he clearly means that they are to be taught, not that goodness is good, but that the Governor of the universe is good."

It will be seen that Jaeger directly opposes this first statement in affirming that the term ἀγαθὸς . . . τῷ ὄντι, attributed to God in 379 B 1, is precisely Plato's way of indicating the mode of being proper to an Idea (cf. n. 36). Again, for Plato to teach his citizens not only that God is *good in reality*, but that goodness is also good, would be an obvious and rhetorical superfluity.

[41] H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore, 1944) App. XI, pp. 603-610. Cherniss asserts that since truth and *nous* are caused by the Idea of the Good, and *nous* is either god or an essential characteristic of what deity may be (pp. 605-606), Plato's Supreme Being must be caused by the Idea of the Good. But there may be a few pertinent *notanda*: first, this analogy expresses a relation of relations, not an identity of relations; secondly the analogous term is αἰτία, expressing efficient causality as may be judged from such expressions as τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, or again from the fact that objects of knowledge receive from the Good their τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Now while it is true that Plato distinguishes the Sun as cause from vision and visibility as effect, and similarly distinguishes the Good from truth and mind, still *in this passage* (509 a) Plato is dealing with truth and mind in a thinker whose thought is not continuous but rather transitory, and whose degree of knowledge may vary from certitude to likehood. Of course the *nous* and ἀλήθεια of such a thinker could not be identical with the Good. But throughout this overall passage (508 a-509 c) Plato seems to accentuate a supereminent causality (508 b κάλλιον, 508 e, ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας which

the identification of Plato's God and Good; Gilson and Solmsen will play the prosecutors.

I. Jaeger: Plato, Homo- Not Cosmo-Centric

According to Jaeger, Plato's *primary* approach to the problem of God is not the pre-Socratic or Aristotelian one from the viewpoint of physical motion, important as it is, but rather the Socratic, namely, the ethical, homocentric one.[43] His major arguments for the identity of Plato's God and Good may be enumerated as based on (1) the attribute of goodness essential to God, (2) the model and its imitation, and (3) beatitude. Jaeger considers that the idea of the Good completely fulfills an essential attribute of God mentioned in the "outlines of theology" as that which always does good and never evil.[44] The expression, ἀγαθὸς . . . τῷ ὄντι, predicated of God "is Plato's way of describing the being of the Idea." [45] In interpreting passage 509 A-B in the *Republic*, Jaeger elaborates his basic nexus between God and the Good which is seen as the "cause of all knowledge and being" just as its visible symbol and offspring, the sun, is the cause of all visibility and becoming." [46] The fact that Plato describes the Good only through the "analogon" of the sun indicates to Jaeger that it is "doubt-

would accord to the cause not merely the pure perfection of the effect, but also its possession in some exemplary way. Thus truth and νοῦς, which Cherniss concedes to be identical with Plato's deity, would be all-perfect, pure *intelligere*. (The imperfection of the analogy is also seen inasmuch as the sun cannot possess vision in the supereminent way that the Good can possess *nous* and truth.) Cf. n. 48.

[43] A. Diès, *Autour de Platon* (Paris, 1927) II 540-61; in Diès' view, the Supreme Being includes both the Idea of the Good and the contemplating intellect of God; but though both are "supreme divinity," yet ultimately the divine intellect owes its perfection to the Idea of the Good which is thus constituted a super-supreme divinity. Rutenber seems to have been influenced in his own conclusion by this distinction of Diès.

[44] Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, 415, n. 39 b.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 416, n. 42.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

ful whether the Good can be apprehended by any intellectual definition." [47] The Good is beyond essence, *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*, in its dignity and power. The meaning of this controverted statement must be derived from a contextual consideration of 532 C, where the vision of the Idea of Good is described as the vision of that which is best in the realm of being, *τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν*: it is therefore the highest Being, and gives reality to everything which we know. Similarly Aristotle, in a fragment of his book on Prayer says that God is 'either Mind, or even beyond Mind' (*ἐκέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ*). Therefore the ambiguity in Plato's conception of the relation of Good to being, shown in both the above-mentioned passages, is not a contradiction for him: either one alternative is true, or else both are true together.[48]

Because the Good is the highest Being and gives reality to all being, Jaeger considers it "the measure of all things." [49] It is central in Platonic philosophy that the philosopher's knowledge of values, phronesis, is an ability to evaluate reality that results from the contemplation of the Good, in the light of which the philosopher-king rules. But this is further proof for Jaeger that the Good and God are one, since in the *Laws* [50]

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 414, n. 37. If a scholastic note is in order here, it appears that Plato in describing the Good as "beyond essence in dignity and power" is developing the way of supereminence used more explicitly by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite in the *Divine Names* and incorporated in the traditional scholastic approach to God. God is affirmed to exist, not to exist, and then to superexist. The simple assertion of God's *esse* is not enough, because the *mode* of creaturely existence must be denied of Him, not because of defect, but by reason of His exemplary possession of the plenitude of being that is beyond all finite comprehension. The Idea of the Good may thus be "beyond essence" or "being" not by defect but by excess of existence because it has no essence that is not one with its *esse*. This view is adopted by Pacheco, *Plato's Conception of Love*, p. 72. For this formula of hyper-existentialism in Plotinus, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Pseudo-Dionysius, cf. René Roques, *L'Univers dionysien* (Paris, 1954), p. 74 f.

[49] Jaeger, p. 286.

[50] *Laws*, 716 C.

Plato asserts explicitly that God is the " measure of all things," against the Protagorean dictum, *homo mensura omnium*, the basis of Sophist paideia.[51]

Secondly, Jaeger argues from the fact that both the idea of the Good and God are proposed as *paradeigmata* for the *mimesis* of men. In the *Republic* [52] the philosophers lift up the eyes of their soul to the source of all intelligibility, the idea of the Good, which is their ultimate model.[53] But in the *Theaetetus* [54] it is God who is made the perfect model, assimilation to whom is the goal of the philosopher's life. Complete manhood entails becoming godlike, for when the philosophic painter cleans off the canvas for a portrayal of man, he contemplates first the forms of justice and beauty, and then the notions current among men; by combining both he will produce a portrait that is at once *ἀνδρείκαλον* and *θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον*. He will rub out and repaint until he has made the moral character of his subject as pleasing as possible in the eyes of heaven.[55] Thus Jaeger concludes: " If God is by nature good, if in fact he is Goodness, then the highest *arete* attainable by man is a process of becoming to resemble God." [56]

The third proof, rooted in beatitude, may be briefly stated in the following:

> If we are right in explaining that Plato held the Idea of Good, as the pattern of everything in the world that deserves the name good, to be 'God,' then it ought also to be called happy; and this would be supported by Plato's thesis that *arete* (being good) is the same as happiness. Absolute Good is the reason for the existence of every kind of *arete* in the world: therefore it must share in happiness, *eudaimonia*, or rather it must be the ultimate source of happiness.[57]

To buttress this argument Jaeger cites a neglected text in the *Republic*, according to which the idea of Good is the happiest

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 416, n. 44.
[52] *Republic*, 540 A.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 416, n. 48.
[54] *Theaetetus*, 176 A.
[55] *Republic*, 501 C.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 287; 416, n. 51.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 286-287.

being in the universe: *τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος.*[58] It must be noted, of course, that properly to be called the source of happiness, the idea of the Good cannot be a neuter, an impersonal being, but must be endowed with personality. Jaeger's entire argument for the identity of Plato's Good and God seems to rest, then, on the primacy of the ethical approach to the problem of God. In this lies the strength, I think, of Jaeger's scholarly proof.

II. Festugière: Plato, the Existentialist

Exponent of the Platonic contemplative life, Festugière advances his interpretation of the nature of Plato's God and Good from the existential standpoint. First in a preliminary view, he underlines the experiential unity of the philosopher and the religious contemplative; then, in a more telling argument, he analyzes Plato's hierarchic notion of being as culminating in a supreme principle, at once God and the Good.

The philosopher is not pure thought; he is an *animal religieux.*[59] Doubtlessly he can distinguish two domains, the philosophic and the religious, but the unity of his own being, of his intellect and will, compel him at some time by a "spontaneous movement of the soul" to posit some relation between the object of his scientific thought, being itself, and the object of his religious contemplation, the divine.[60] He betrays the indigence of his entire soul in trying to escape from a world of change, where evil is commingled with good, ugliness with beauty, and pain with joy; he seeks after the absolute source of the good, the beautiful, and the joyful in a world of perfect and unchanging being.[61] This is more than an itinerary of the intellect that searches to find the primal fountain of reality; it

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 416, n. 47; *Republic*, 526 E.
[59] A. Festugière, *Contemplation*, p. 253; cf. n. 16.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 253.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

is also the quest of the will that seeks its beatitude. The *Phaedo* expresses this truth in calling the philosopher's life a continual rehearsal of death;[62] again, "the soul, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and intellectual, where she is secure in happiness and freed from the errors and folly of men . . . and forever dwells in the company of the gods."[63] From this locus Festugière draws these conclusions: 1) the goal of the soul's flight is described as invisible, i. e., the intelligible or the realm of the *Idée*; again, this invisible realm is likened to the divine, the realm of truth; 2) the vision or company of the divine Ideas imparts beatitude to the soul: "the object of philosophic contemplation is the same as that which is offered to the religious soul, the soul in love with goodness."[64] It may be noted that these are not necessary conclusions from the text cited, nor is the entire argument anything more than a dispository approach to the central problem. It may, however, be a profound intuition into the heart of Platonism.[65]

Festugière's main argument, based on the hierarchic notion of being, may be termed the "proof" from a correspondence between being and the divine:

> If there is a correspondence between the divine and being, if a being is more divine inasfar as it is more existential—with the recognition, moreover, that being is identified with Forms—it is clear that the formal Principle that unifies the Forms, which is, since it is *the* principle, more existential than the Forms, is also more divine. The movement toward the divine ends normally in the Beautiful of the *Symposium*, Good of the *Republic*, in the One of the *Philebus*. That is God, first and principally. Since the world of Forms, conceived under the aspect of a plurality of hierarchized intelligibles, only holds both intelligibility

[62] *Phaedo*, 67 D-E.
[63] *Ibid.*, 81 A.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[65] For a more extensive treatment by Festugière, see *L'Idéal religieux des Grecs et l'Évangile* (Paris, 1932) "Les origines de l'Idée de Dieu chez Platon," pp. 171-195.

and existence by participation in the Good-One, this world is only divine secondarily. In rigorous terms, that which is God strictly, is that which is more being; it is then the unifying Principle. Such is, to my way of thinking, the true pinnacle of Platonic theology, the true God of Plato.[66]

A few critical comments on this argument may be in order. The major of this syllogism, that the more existential a being is, the more divine it is, is assumed by the author as proven in a previous part of the chapter entitled: "The Visible Gods and the Invisible Good." It is true enough that Plato considered the realm of the visible world, the realm of becoming, as less real and less divine than the realm of the Ideas, the realm of being. In the *Statesman* he asserts that only the most divine of all remain ever unchanged and the same, and body is not included in this class.[67] Festugière stresses the "ever existent" attribute as a middle term between the Ideas and God. But it is doubtful whether he actually proves *from the text of Plato* that the most existential being is God, as the pinnacle of the pyramid of being. A probable case may be built up by collating further texts not immediately cited by Festugière: the already mentioned assertion in *Laws* 476 D that God is the measure of all; again, in *Republic* 597 C where God is called the "Maker of all," something reminiscent of the Demiurge in *Timaeus* 29 A; and in *Phaedrus* 249-250 where true being is beheld by the soul that follows God. Moreover, in the minor of his argument, Festugière declares without immediate proof that the Good, the One, and the Beautiful are identical; again this identity may well be within at least probable proof from such texts as *Symposium* 201 B, 204 E; *Parmenides* 134 D, and *Timaeus* 68 D. Finally, that the Good is pure being whose essence is to exist does not seem definitively proven, although it may be considered probable from Festugière's further analysis.[68]

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265. [67] *Statesman*, 269 C. [68] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

III. Gilson: Plato, the Traditionalist

As an historian of philosophy, Gilson adopts a characteristic approach to this central problem in Plato; he considers the nature of Plato's gods in the light of Greek tradition, and then affirms that the impersonality of the Ideas in Plato is utterly incompatible with a supreme personal God.

Considering Festugière's argument that the Good is the most existential and so the most divine being in Platonic thought, and consequently one with God, Gilson does not deny the logical validity of the conclusion; he simply denies that Plato drew the conclusion.[69] The first reason why Plato did not do so is rooted in his notion of god. Every soul is a god, the stars are gods, the world is a god, or in Thales' phrase, is "full of gods." Plato perhaps invented the Ideas, but he inherited the gods. The reason for declaring the existence of a god is the fact of self-movement; just as the spontaneous motion of the human being must be accounted for by a soul, so also must the motion of the stars. But the soul is "the very pattern after which men have formed their notion of god." [70] Furthermore, like the soul, a god must be intelligent, necessary, and eternal; a god has thus the attributes of the Ideas, though the Ideas are only intelligibles.[71] But the two orders, of gods and of Ideas, are kept distinct: "his gods are just as distinct from his philosophical principles as an order of persons is distinct from an order of things." [72]

This basic fact, that Plato's Ideas are not regarded as personal, Gilson claims, is the obvious reason why Plato never drew Festugière's conclusion.[73] Modern scholars, living in a Christian milieu, naturally find it extremely difficult to "imagine a world where the gods are not the highest reality, while that

[69] E. Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, p. 26; cf. n. 38.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[72] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 26, n. 23.

which is most supremely real in it is not a god." [74] This inferiority of the gods to the Ideas is seen in the fact that while the sun is regarded by Plato as a god, it is also called the child of the Good, which is not called a god.[75] Moreover, even if the Ideas are called divine,[76] it does not mean that they are gods. "The identification of the Platonic Ideas with gods is still waiting for its historic justification." [77] In his later work, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Gilson claims that Plato's Good is "supreme non-being and supreme unintelligibility," so that if Plato's God were identical with the Good, it would appear to be nonexistent.[78]

Since Gilson has advanced some cogent arguments against Festugière, it may be profitable to consider his own arguments in the light of Jaeger's analysis. 1) Gilson admits the logical coherence of Festugière's conclusion from Platonic data, but denies that Plato drew the conclusion. Jaeger will admit that Plato did not explicate his identification of the Good with God, because "it was so obvious that the reader could fill it in without help, and also because it was important to distinguish his supreme being from the gods of everyday religion." [79] 2) Gilson denies that there is any union between the Ideas and God; but Jaeger points to the text (as Gilson does not, but rather follows a traditional criticism) that God is "good and reality," a phrase that Jaeger claims indicates the very being of an Idea. Plato's God as good is seen in text and context as being essential and underived goodness. Scholastic as this interpretation is, few will claim that Jaeger's scholarship is a christianizing of Plato. 3) Gilson interprets the celebrated expression describing the Good, "beyond essence in dignity and power," as indicating

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 27. This seems like *lucus a non lucendo*.
[76] *Phaedo*, 80.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 27, n. 23.
[78] Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, 1949) p. 20.
[79] Jaeger, *Paideia*, II, p. 286.

that the Good is "supreme non-being" and "supreme unintelligibility." Jaeger, however, appeals to a parallel text in the same dialogue to show that the Good is the happiest being in the universe,[80] a text that points not only to a fact of supreme existence, but also to a personal intellectual and volitional existence. Moreover, the Good, far from being unintelligible, is described as the supreme object of intelligence, "the best of existents," [81] and the goal of the philosophic contemplative after his dialectic ascent from the world of image and shadow. 4) Gilson makes no mention of the identity of attributes between the God of the *Laws* as the measure of all things and the *Good* as the measure of all intelligibility and being in the *Republic*.[82] (While it is not, of course, proposed that Plato's Good or God is a Creator in the technical sense, still there is at least one scholastic, Armando Pacheco in a thesis at Notre Dame, who holds this position.)[83] In view of this comparative study of Jaeger and Gilson, it seems safe to say that Gilson's arguments are far from conclusive, and at most only probable.

IV. Solmsen: Plato, the Cosmologist

Basing his arguments partly on the *Republic*, but mainly on the 10th book of the *Laws*, Solmsen asserts that the function of the gods in the Platonic state is primarily only an educational one, and hence marks them as inferior to the Ideas; and secondly, the gods, especially in the *Laws*, act as intermediaries between the unchanging world of Ideas and the changing world of becoming.

First of all, Solmsen grants that Plato speaks in religious terms of the Good in the *Republic*, since there is a strong religious element in the ideal Platonic state. But Plato's philoso-

[80] *Republic*, 526 E.
[81] *Ibid.*, 832 C.
[82] *Ibid.*, 504 C, 506 A, 509 B.
[83] Pacheco, *Plato's Conception of Love*, p. 75 (Cf. n. 18a): "The case is extraordinary, but we must admit here that Plato's God is a total creator."

phy of religion looks on the gods as on a plane below the Ideas; since philosophy has a limited appeal in any generation, religion offers a more concretely appealing ideal in "morally unimpeachable gods and heroes."[84] The majority of the members of the *Republic* do not need and are perhaps incapable of the abstract dialectic that ends in the contemplation of the Ideas. This is for the elite, the philosopher-rulers for whom the "source, standard, and criterion of Good is not God, but the Idea of the Good."[85] According to this view, what is the status of the gods? The non-philosophers, the soldiery and artisans, will attribute the cause of every individual good, not to the Idea of Good, but to the gods.[86] Solmsen considers this attribution in harmony with the *Laws* that recognizes that,

> even when the Theory of Ideas was fully developed, there was still room for the gods to bring about what is good. It might be said that the Ideas are the formal, the gods the efficient cause, and that as Aristotle would say, the formal causes need the efficient in order to be realized.[87]

Turning from this ethical to the cosmological view of the problem, Solmsen presents his fundamental argument. Book Ten of the *Laws* affirms the primacy of *psyche* as the source of all movement; for without this first, eternal, "self-generating and completely independent" principle of life, there could be no life nor motion in the universe.[88] This principle of life is Plato's God, a self-moving being unmoved by another, between the two realms of being and becoming:

> Plato's God is not an Idea, nor are his Ideas Gods. We are likely to miss the peculiar character of his theology unless we realize that the place of his god is on the boundary between Being and Becoming.

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[84] Solmsen, *Plato's Theology*, p. 72.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[86] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[87] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 90.

> He is the principle through which the physical world of becoming partakes of the qualities of Being. Thanks to the work of Soul (and of Mind as its auxiliary) there is in the visible world something that is 'in the same state forever' or 'behaves always in the same fashion.' . . .[89]

In this analysis, Plato's God is a twofold principle, a Mind that contemplates the eternal and absolutely immutable Ideas (which are visibly symbolized for contemplatives in the eternal stars), and a Soul that establishes contact with the material world by acting as a prime mover and engendering life.[90] God is, then, a supreme being only in a relative sense. He does not possess the absolute immutability and perfection of the Ideas that he contemplates. It should be noted that this interpretation is partially based on the exegesis of a disputed passage in the *Sophist* according to which παντελῶς ὄν, "being in its fullness," is understood to refer, not to any transcendent idea, but to the cosmos as a whole in which are found life, soul, and mind.[91]

While this brief summary hardly does justice to Solmsen's thesis, it is hoped that there is no positive difformity present. A sketchy criticism must take into account E. Frank's strictures in his review of Solmsen's work.[92] The basic assumption of Solmsen, that the tenth book of the *Laws* has "scientifically established" the basis of Platonic theology, is challenged on the grounds that in the *Laws*:

> Plato obviously deals with 'the Gods ordained by laws,'[93] i.e., with the gods of civic religion. Even the 'preludes' to the laws are only παραμυθίαι intended to 'persuade' the people and to be used 'exactly like poems' in the education of youths.[94] It is therefore misleading to

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[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 80, *Sophist*, 248 E-249 A.
[92] E. Frank, *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945) 92-96 cf. n. 1.
[93] *Laws*, 984 A.
[94] *Ibid.*, 720 ff. and 811 D ff.

look to them as Solmsen does for an adequate presentation of Plato's 'scientific' thought.[95]

Moreover, Frank disagrees with Solmsen over the meaning of the passage cited from the *Sophist* 248 E, since in his opinion it refers to the *τὸ παντελὲς ζῷον* of *Timaeus* 31 A, which he claims is intended to designate the transcendent Idea in the likeness of which the cosmos is made: "For that living Being embraces and contains within itself all the intelligible living beings just as this Cosmos contains us and all the other visible creatures."[96] The cosmos, according to Frank, must be regarded as only a "secondary" god on the testimony of Plato's pupil, Xenocrates, who ranks it inferior to the One, the *πρῶτος θεός*. While in Solmsen's view Plato's God is really the World-Soul, Frank wonders "how could the World-Soul in Plato's eyes be the highest God if he defines it [the World-Soul] as a mixture of absolute and corporeal Being . . . ?"[97] Finally, a major flaw found in Solmsen's presentation is the failure to utilize the testimony of ancient writers on this central point, perhaps because they testify to the identity of God and the Good.[98] Plato recognized the transcendence of his primary God and posited intermediaries, beings called "daimons" by Plato's pupils:

For Plato, as for most Greek philosophers, the world no doubt was divine, was God, but for Plato the world was neither the only God nor the highest God. He envisaged a hierarchy of 'gods and daimons'[99] and his pupils tried to bring these diverse aspects of the divine into a consistent system.[100]

This theme of the hierarchy of gods (and of being), a theme so fertile for Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, seems to be

[95] E. Frank, *A. J. P.*, LXVI (1945) 93.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 95, *Timaeus*, 30 C.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 95, *Timaeus*, 34 C.
[98] *Ibid.*, p. 94, nn. 2, 3.
[99] *Phaed.*, 246 E, *Polit.* 269 ff., etc.
[100] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

central in the problem. It is a point neglected in the arguments of Gilson, for while none will deny the plurality of gods in Plato, the question is whether one God is supreme over all; if so, what is his relation to the Good.

V. Conclusion: Platonic Skepsis

What conclusion is to be drawn from this array of arguments? It appears evident that either side of the question may at least be adopted with probability *ab extrinsico*. The point at issue seems to resolve into the question of which opinion is the more probable, on the supposition, of course, that the two propositions advanced are mutually exclusive: either Plato's Good is his Supreme God or not. Those who will not admit a hierarchy of gods in Plato seem to be in the minority opinion; those who do not admit the supremacy of the Good *are* in the minority opinion. What then is the relationship between the two Supremes, God and the Good? This writer opts for their identification as more probable, mainly on the cogency of Jaeger's arguments, partly on the *convenientia* of Festugière's view of Platonic existentialism, partly on the inadequacies of Gilson's interpretations as pointed out in the text. The lack of certitude on this point that seems inevitable in any exegesis of Plato lies buried in what Luigi Stefanini calls "the mystery that is Plato."[101] Xenocrates testifies to the fact that Plato kept a forbidding silence about the discussion of the Good; in the *Timaeus* he asserts: "but the father and maker of this universe is past finding out; and even if we should find him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible."[102] Strangest of all, the insignificance of formularized philosophy in Plato's eyes, makes one hesitate to schematize his theology; his "scientific" writings are not extant, and he regarded his role of

[101] L. Stefanini, "The Mystery That is Plato," trans. A. di Lascia, *Cross Currents*, II (1952) 49-68.

[102] *Timaeus*, 28 D.

teacher with far higher esteem than any of the "popular" dialogues which have survived. Plato even remarked in the Seventh Epistle (now proven beyond reasonable doubt to belong to the Platonic Corpus): "As for me, at least no work on such a topic (philosophy) exists, nor ever will exist. It is indeed impossible to express philosophy in formulas, as is done in the other sciences; it is only after long communion and familiarity with given problems that truth suddenly shines in the soul as the light given off from a spark. . . ." [102] This Platonic *skepsis*, far from the relativism of the Pythagoreans and Sophists, is somewhat akin, I venture, to the existentialism of St. Thomas who in his last words is said to have called his *Summa Theologiae* so much "straw." The reality vastly transcends its conceptual expression.

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[102] *Seventh Epistle*, 341 C-D.

Is There a Philosophy of History?

by Robert Paul Mohan, S.S.

THE TERM, "philosophy of history" is not calculated to put at ease the mind either of the professional historian or the professional philosopher, for it has come to mean different things to different people. It is employed only because its use is a *fait accompli*, and because it is consistently employed, however inaccurately, to designate an area of investigation which has, since the time of Spengler—and more recently since the popularization of the Somervell abridgement of Toynbee—acquired increasing prominence in popular as well as scholarly circles.

In the general sense of the term, philosophy of history has come to mean an exploration of the relationship of historical thought and writing to both theology and philosophy. It is by no means limited to a search for laws of history by which eschatological prophets or secular futurists can lay bare the metaphysic or dialectic of the historical process.[1] It is in this latter sense that the historian is particularly inclined to deny the existence of a philosophy of history. As Collingwood has phrased it:

> Eschatology is always an intrusive element in history. The historian's business is to know the past, not to know the future; and whenever historians claim to be able to determine the future in advance of its happening, we may know with certainty that something has gone wrong with their fundamental conception of history.[2]

It may be objected, however, that the historian does not always work in the aura of calm objectivity that he sometimes

[1] Cf. E. de Groot, "Is There a Metaphysic of History?" *Hibbert Journal*, LI (1952) 217-225.

[2] R. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford, 1946) p. 54.

assumes. The so-called "factual" historian in particular is inclined to look with a certain air of condescension on what he feels to be the ineffectual efforts of theology and philosophy to give to "airy nothingness, a local habitation and a name." I should like to by-pass this problem for the moment, however, to explore various theories about the name.

Juan Donoso Cortés refers in his *Ensayo* to St. Augustine's *City of God* as a "Catholic philosophy of history." In his essay on Vico, however, he refers to Boussuet as the "first philosopher of history." [3] Vico himself is called by H. P. Adams "the founder of philosophy of history." [4] Karl Löwith, in referring to a period of crisis at the end of the 17th century, when, as he says, "Providence was replaced by progress," insists that Voltaire's *Essay on the Manners and Mind of Nations* (1756) is the first philosophy of history; and Löwith considers this event the inauguration of an epoch of historical evaluation basically anti-religious.[5] Marie Collins Swabey rejects this identification of philosophical history with figures like Voltaire, Montesquieu, or Kant, and prefers to consider the problem in terms of general orientation.[6] W. H. Walsh, in his *Introduction to Philosophy of History,* claims that philosophy of history first gained recognition in 1784 with the publication of the first part of Herder's *Ideas for a Philosophical History of Mankind.*[7] Collingwood maintains that the name at least "was invented by Voltaire, who meant by it no more than critical or scientific history." [8] Shirley Jackson Case concedes that Voltaire may be said to have coined the phrase, but considers that

[3] Cf. T. Neill, "Juan Donoso Cortés: History and 'Prophecy.'" *The Catholic Historical Review,* XL (1955) 392-393.

[4] H. Adams, *The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico* (London, 1935). Jacket summary of contents.

[5] K. Löwith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago, 1950) p. 104.

[6] M. Swabey, *The Judgment of History* (New York, 1954) p. 175.

[7] W. Walsh, *An Introduction to Philosophy of History* (London. 1951) p. 11.

[8] Collingwood, *op. cit.,* p. 1.

the technique of evaluation involved is current in the thought of the ancient Hebrews.[9] Father Gilbert Garraghan, considering philosophy of history "essentially a theological concept," claims that Augustine was the first to state a philosophy of history, in his *City of God*.[10] Raymond Aron's use of the term is more like that of Case and Swabey. He is concerned with a philosophical conception of the historical process as a whole, in opposition to positivism and "rationalisme scientiste." [11]

From such a variety of opinion some basic facts emerge. The name at least, originates with Voltaire, who summarizes his position in the dictum: "Il faut écrire l'histoire en philosophe." Secondly, not all writers on the subject introduce theology as a consideration. And finally, there is no general agreement as to the role philosophy should play in historical interpretation. This difference is reflected in an oscillation between extremes of factual and philosophic history that seems to take place over the years.

Factual history prides itself on independence from philosophy and theology alike, sometimes ignoring causation as well as Providence. But the factual history that merits the pejorative title, *historismus*, is not as independent of philosophy as it suspects. Like Molière's Monsieur Jourdain who was surprised to find out that he had been speaking prose all of his life, even the most extreme of factual historians is involved in philosophy however inadvertently. For his very adoption of a guiding principle is nothing more than an articulation of positivism—in less familiar form, perhaps, than the positivism of Comte and Littré—but positivism all the same. As Ross Hoffman has expressed it:

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[9] S. Case, *The Christian Philosophy of History* (Chicago, 1943) p. 16.

[10] G. Garraghan, S. J., *A Guide to Historical Method* (New York, 1951) pp. 368, 373.

[11] R. Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1948) p. 12.

> It is that type of history associated with Leopold von Ranke and his school, which allegedly restricts the historian to a mere recording of facts without attempt to search out and interpret the deep-lying forces that operate below their surface. . . . It ignores the existence of metaphysical, non-sensible factors, that is, such as are not open to physical investigation. It is rationalism in history.[12]

The objectivity for which the positivist strives is indeed laudable, but that kind of factual history is difficult because it is impossible. Its exponents insist that deeds should speak for themselves. But the deeds of the past never speak for themselves. They are notoriously mute until they are selected by a man who employs standards of selection and assembled in a context in conformity with epistemological principles which are either formally accepted or unconsciously assumed. No historian is a mere statistician. It is true that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066 irrespective of the philosophical complexion of the man who records the event; but the mere recording of the event is not history. Its significance is involved in profundities much more subtle than the simple citation of the fact. That is why John Bury, author of one of the classic texts on the concept of progress, could say that he could not imagine the slightest importance in a collection of facts unless they meant something in terms of reason, and offered hope that one might determine their vital connection in a whole system of reality.

Even rationalists like Langlois and Seignobos admit that the positivistic historian, while rejecting the validity of a philosophy of history or a philosophical frame of reference, bring back the idea in disguise.[13] The master idea may be that of race, as in the writing of Alfred Rosenberg and H. Taine; it

[12] R. Hoffman, "Catholicism and Historismus." *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXIV (1939) 401.

[13] C. Langlois and C. Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History* (New York, 1898).

may be economic determinism as in Marx, or a kind of economic socialism as in Beard; it may be destiny interpreted in terms of cultural morphology as in Spengler, or even factors of climate and geography as in Buckle and Huntington.[14]

At the other extreme, one must admit that philosophical history is prone to tendentiousness far less subtle. Many of the legitimate criticisms are contained in a searching chapter by Maurice Mandelbaum in *The Problem of Historical Knowledge.* He distinguishes philosophy of history (which he defines as the effort of historians, sociologists, and philosophers to interpret the significance of the historical process as a whole) from universal histories, compendia of historical knowledge which do not claim to reveal a message, and from pragmatic histories, "which find particular lessons applicable to present dilemmas in specific portions of the past." [15]

Admittedly, the man with strong philosophical prejudices—or theological prejudices, for that matter—can make historical data serve his purpose. For facts are not always the stubborn things that Justice Frankfurter once claimed them to be. They are really very agile performers, and fit quite comfortably into many divergent contexts. This idea has been illustrated by the quaint story of the two Chinese gentlemen watching a strenuous set of tennis between two Maryknoll missioners, after which, one of the gentlemen, wishing to be helpful, suggests that they let the coolies take care of that sort of work.

I think too, that this is the experience of many a graduate student, who realizes for the first time to his horror that he is far more interested in finding facts to support a position than in finding the truth, which is the only reason for maintaining a position. Saying good-by to an untenable thesis is often like

[14] Toynbee alludes to the same sort of thing in his discussion of the arrested Polynesian and Eskimo civilizations.

[15] M. Mandelbaum, *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (New York, 1938) p. 306.

saying good-by to an old friend, with the added melancholy note that both can never meet again in respectable circles.

I remember listening to a lecture in history at the Sorbonne some years ago, at which Professor Jean Canu, before referring the class to the histories of France written by Jacques Bainville and Octave Aubry, humorously cited a history of the French nation to match almost every religious and political taste.

I have mentioned that there seems to be in historical analysis an oscillation from the *historismus* ideal to a philosophical tendentiousness which is often more of a diary of psychological reaction to events, rather than a reasonably objective attempt to understand the events themselves. The details concerning these presuppositions in historical writing may be found in the histories of historical writing, such as those of Shotwell and Thompson.[16]

The Greeks, for instance, despite their philosophic genius, were not given to "philosophical history" as popularly understood. Thucydides and Herodotus seem to think of history as political history; and although Isaias and Herodotus were almost contemporaries, the transcendent goal of the historical process as preached by Isaias would be meaningless subjectivity to a Greek mind accustomed to thinking in terms of cyclicism.

The entire Judaic-Christian tradition envisages the temporal order only in terms of a supra-temporal *eschaton*. That is why temporal events were never divorced from their ultimate significance by men like St. Augustine or Bossuet. But even one who thinks in terms of Divine Providence might legitimately feel that Bossuet, for example, is a bit too eager in explaining the temporal in terms of divine intervention.[17]

[16] T. Shotwell, *The History of History* (New York, 1939); and J. Thompson, *A History of Historical Writing* (New York, 1942).

[17] There is a huge bibliography on the relation between theology and history. Cf., for example, C. Loughran, "Theology and History, A Bibliography," *Thought*, XXIX (1954) 101-115; and G. Thils, "La théologie de l'histoire," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, XXVI (1950) 87-95.

As late as the 18th century, even rationalists like Voltaire, Hume and Gibbon, who by no stretch of the imagination are considered apostles of the transcendent, interpreted historical data in terms of its corporate meaning.

The 19th century did see a trend to positivistic history, which deprecated this infelicitous and somewhat indecent liaison between history and philosophy. It seems simply that the historian of the 19th century was a child of his time, and that his approach to historical writing was a reflection of his approach to reality in general.[18]

I do not wish to create the impression that I believe all historians who are critical of philosophical history to be pagan positivists. Many respectable scholars have very little patience at all with the philosopher of history, and acknowledge a complete disbelief that there is such a thing as the philosophy of history. One even suggested that the purpose of guided readings he gave his students was to shake the student out of his philosophic way of thinking.

Observing all of the academic amenities, I must say that I consider this position completely untenable. First of all, I feel that it is based on an assumed premise that historical objectivity is not only possible without philosophy, but much better off without it. To shake a student out of his philosophic way of thinking would be to shake him out of his rationality—a project that would be as difficult as it would be nefarious. The historian is first of all a man, and from the first moment he engages in technical research, he is up to his neck in epistemology, whether he admits it or not.

His very intellectual quest is motivated by an anterior conviction that there is something to be found, and that he is equipped to find it. He is involved in the propaedeutic philosophical science of logic whenever he lets his mind work with

[18] G. Gooch, *History and Historians in the 19th Century* (London, 1913).

the wealth of data of the historical past. He is involved in axiology every time he makes a value judgment in his task of selection. And inasmuch as he cannot report all, he must make a selection. He takes a position on causality every time he associates events, whether he examines them in terms of causal relation or merely in terms of temporal sequence. He is involved in rational psychology when he discusses human beings, human activities and human institutions. For man is either free to choose, create, or destroy, or is, as pictured by men like Spengler, a portion of a culture as mortal as himself, destined to flourish and die in an unswerving morphological pattern irrespective of human choice.

In all of these fields, in which we have prescinded entirely from theological considerations, the historian is still involved in philosophy.

The western world of the twentieth century has seen a great interest in the meaning as well as in the minutiae of the historical process. It is not to be found alone in the German, Spengler, or in the Englishmen, Toynbee and Dawson; we find this interest in the Spaniard, Ortega, in the expatriate Russian, Berdyaev, in the Russian-American, Sorokin, in the Frenchmen, Gilson and Maritain.

There is a diversity of nationality as there is a diversity of opinion, but it seems to me that one can be more precise in discussing the three basic views to which all philosophic history is reduced—and I use the term philosophic history in the widest sense of the term. The first is the theory of cyclical recurrence, almost universally held in ancient Greece and revived more recently by Friedrich Nietzsche. Ancient Greece may seem to be a rather general designation, but as Christopher Dawson has phrased it:

> From the age of Pythagoras and Heraclitus down to the last days of the School of Athens under the Christian emperors, the doctrine of

the Great Year, and the recurrent cycle of cosmic change dominated the Greek mind." [19]

Nietzsche's restoration of this ancient theme is particularly interesting, as it indicates an opposition to the linear history of indefinite progress which had such great influence during his life time. The doctrine of eternal recurrence is one of the main themes of Nietzsche's entire philosophy. When he was eighteen, twenty years before his *Zarathustra*, he speculated on whether or not the standard pattern of human existence was the classical view of the universe as an eternal cosmos, or the Christian concept of creation by an omnipotent God. To him the religion of indefinite progress was merely a secularization of the Christian point of view that all reality moves to a final consummation.[20]

The second mode of evaluation of the historical process as a whole is the linear futurism of the secular progressivists. These are the disciples of Condorcet, who envisage not a transcendent goal, but a supreme earthly one. Their aim is not a heavenly Jerusalem, but an antiseptically-clean Babylon. Although this kind of thinking has often been grouped with the Judaic-Christian concept of eschatological direction, the two are really worlds apart.

There is, it is true, a general similarity of direction, and the pagan humanist and Christian citizen in their common civic and social efforts will use techniques almost identical. But the civic house cleaning they do has different motivations; the humanist has already arrived in the only world he will ever

[19] C. Dawson, *Progress and Religion* (New York, 1933) p. 146. There are, however, some traces of futurism in the thought of Epicurus and Lucretius, Cf. also my "The God Called Progress," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXXIX (1953) 73-82.

[20] Some classical sources for the doctrine of eternal recurrence: Heraclitus, *Fragments* 30, 31, 51, 63, 67, 88; Empedocles, *Fragment* 115; Aristotle, *Meta.*, XII, 8; *De Caelo*, I, 3 and 14. The theme is common in Plato, especially in the *Timaeus*.

know, whereas the Christian, though committed to a belief in another world, is not necessarily obliged to make himself miserable in this one.

The third point of view is that of eschatological direction. The entire temporal process receives its ultimate significance in terms of a goal that essentially transcends it. Here we are clearly involved in theology; but I do not believe we are clearly involved in linear history. It is quite true that the Christian looks forward to the *parousia*. But there is in the middle of the historical process itself what Collingwood calls an "apocalyptic" event, the mystery of the Incarnation, which establishes for the Christian a different polarity. The pre-Christian era is the era of anticipation, the Incarnation is the central event, and consequent history will have, from the Christian point of view a peculiar ambivalence. It will look back to the Incarnation, but it will look ahead to the last judgment, the ultimate fulfilment. This Christian point of view itself has been called incarnational if it considers the temporal worthy of redemption; but both in and outside Catholic Christianity there have been those who look upon the temporal as irremediably bad and unworthy of redemption.[21] This surely is the extreme of otherworldliness, and sometimes manifests itself, not only in a disdain of the historical, but in a contempt for intellectuality itself.[22]

From these rather general observations, I should like to propose for consideration several conclusions:

1. The term "philosophy of history" is a rather infelicitous one, as it includes in present usage, prophecy, theology, and philosophically-oriented history, or historical writing in which philosophy is emphasized.

[21] Cf. L. Malavez, "La vision chrétienne de l'historie," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, LXXI (1949) 113-134, 259.

[22] Cf. E. Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1948).

2. Philosophy of history in the sense of prophecy quite probably does not exist; for the universe is not a neat mechanism which promises inevitably to the future what it has delivered to the past. Man is still free, and choice is mystery itself.

3. Augustinian history is basically theological, and for those of us for whom God is the *alpha* and *omega*, the temporal will inevitably be judged in terms of our eternal destiny.

4. The acceptance of transcendence and Providence by no means dispenses us from the obligation of technical historical research. The world against which Christ inveighed was not a place but a spirit. And if we accept the analogy of being, the knowledge of this world, however faint an adumbration of divine wisdom, has the same intrinsic value and dignity. Contempt for worldly wisdom and knowledge is not only theologically questionable, but philosophically repugnant. It is a refuge of philistines who cultivate ignorance as if it were an art.

5. The historian who would avoid philosophy entirely in his work is doing one of two things; he is refusing to acknowledge his philosophical presuppositions, or he is not writing history.

6. The respective sciences of theology, philosophy, and history have legitimate insularity in the world of knowledge. Revelation is divine truth and a divine gift, but does not absolve us from the responsibility of using that other divine gift—our mind. Philosophy will give us our principles, but it will not make us historians. We in the academic world live and work in the light of the primal decree: "By the sweat of thy brow, thou shalt earn thy bread." This applies to us who would be fed by the bread of truth also.

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The Nature of Alteration in Aristotle

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ARISTOTELIAN MOTION, in the narrower, more proper sense of "the actuality of the potential as such,"[1] is a phenomenon common to three of the supreme genera of being: quantity, quality, and place.[2] Accordingly, Aristotle predicates of κίνησις certain characteristics without restriction to any of the categories which contain it. It is an "incomplete actuality,"[3] "in time,"[4] "infinitely divisible,"[5] without a "primary when,"[6] and so forth. All these propositions are just so many corollaries of the master note of motion, continuity.[7]

Most of these characteristics, however, form a group which cannot be applied to *qualitative* motion ("alteration")[8] without encountering serious difficulties. Due to the fact that a quality *taken in itself* is not susceptible of intensification or remission,[9] the question must be raised how (and in certain cases

[1] *Meta.*, K, 9, 1065b16. Aristotle uses a similar expression in at least nine places. Κινεῖν can refer to change in general, including substantial (*e. g.* V *Phys.*, I, 224a27).

The English translations of Aristotle's text used in this article are taken from the Oxford edition, unless otherwise indicated.

[2] V *Phys.*, 2, 226a24, and many other places.

[3] *Ibid.* III, 2, 201b31 and elsewhere.

[4] *Ibid.* VI, 4, 235a11 and similarly perhaps a dozen times.

[5] *Ibid.* III, 1, 200b20.

[6] *Ibid.* VI, 5, 236a13-27.

[7] *Ibid.*, V, 4, 228a20 and elsewhere.

[8] For definitions of quality and alteration see respectively *Meta.*, Δ, 14, 1020b8 and V *Phys.*, 2, 226a26.

[9] ". . . in a process of change we may distinguish three terms—that which changes, that in which it changes, and the actual subject of change, e.g. the man, the time, and the fair complexion. Of these the man and the time are divisible: but with the fair complexion it is otherwise . . ." (VI *Phys.*, 5, 236b2-6).

". . . that which is not *per se* continuous is divisible into species which are finite in number. Since then, the several sensible qualities of things

whether)[10] alteration can be said to be perfectly continuous—and thus "in time," "infinitely divisible," and so forth.

The Philosopher himself does not pronounce explicitly.[11] He

are to be reckoned as species . . ." (*De Sensu*, 6, 445b28-29). Philoponus seems to suggest the *per se* divisibility of certain qualities—"not *all* are divisible *secundum se*" (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* [Berlin, 1882-1909], Vol. XVII, *Joannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quinque Posteriores Commentaria*, p. 809, 26; translation mine). Apparently the only text that might support him is the one in the *Categories*: "Qualities admit of variation of degree. Whiteness is predicated of one thing in a greater or less degree than of another. This is also the case with reference to justice. Moreover, one and the same thing may exhibit a quality in a greater degree than it did before: if a thing is white, it may become whiter.

"Though this is generally the case, there are exceptions. For if we should say that justice admitted of variation of degree, difficulties might ensue, and this is true with regard to all those qualities which are dispositions. There are some, indeed, who dispute the possibility of variation here. They maintain that justice and health cannot very well admit of variation of degree themselves, but that people vary in the degree in which they possess these qualities, and that this is the case with grammatical learning and all those qualities which are classed as dispositions." (*Categories*, 8, 10b26-11a15.) This of course is very cautious. Even here Aristotle is prepared to admit the *per se* indivisibility of the "dispositions"; besides, he seems careful to *express* the variation (even in the case of white, which I think he never classes as a "disposition," διάθεσις, [see *Categories*, 8, 8b26 ff. and *Meta.*, Δ, 20-21, 1022b10-18]) in the concrete with "is predicated" (λέγεται, 10b27) and "takes an increase" (ἐπίδοσιν λαμβάνει, 10b28; translation mine).

At any rate, this text seems to be a unique hesitation of his early period, not to be imitated in the *Physics* or elsewhere. (Many scholars even reject the *Categories* on account of the "peculiar character" which Husik explains "on the ground of its being one of the earliest attempts of Aristotle" [Isaac Husik, "The Authenticity of the Categories," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVI (1939) 431]. See *ibid.*, p. 428 for Husik's list of those who reject the writing.) It is interesting to note that Aristotle's example of a *per se* indivisible quality in the *Physics* (VI, 5, 236b5, 7) is not a "disposition," but *white* (λευκὸν, Oxf. "fair complexion"). Finally, at least some of the commentators are eager to invoke "participation" and a μίξις of contraries apropos of this very text (*e. g.* Ammonius, *Commentaria Graeca*, Vol. IV, *Ammonius in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarius*, part 4, p. 90, 9-12). (The Greek in this note, as throughout the article, is Bekker's.)

[10] See below, section III.

[11] In the works edited by Bekker and indexed by Bonitz.

merely lays down certain principles in the course of his discussions of quality and motion which the exegete must accept as starting points for an analysis of the problem. Thus whatever the solution, it can hardly be formally "Aristotle's." Yet a careful use of what Aristotle *has* declared explicitly will perhaps reveal what he *should have* held on the question at hand, on the strength of his own principles. This discovery will be the aim of our inquiry.

I. The Nature of Alteration

Aristotle is altogether definite on the continuity, successiveness, and infinite divisibility of κίνησις.[12] Equally strong is his insistence on a real κίνησις in the predicament "quality."[13] The question therefore arises how motion in a quality can be continuous in view of the indivisibility of the quality itself.

Aristotle, as we have noted, leaves us no explicit solution. But since we know that the quality of the subject must vary gradually throughout the alteration, and that qualities are not variable *per se*, we can begin to set up an answer to our problem *ad mentem Philosophi* by considering how many ways a quality could be said to vary *accidentally*.

By far the most popular accidental division of quality is that dependent upon the quantitative divisibility of the subject in which it inheres. Since the parts of this subject are extended beyond each other, the inhering quality must be divided when its subject is.[14]

A *second* and *third* possibility, with an explanation of our first, are suggested by Aristotle in an exposition of three modes of color participation. I summarize the text:[15]

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[12] See nn. 3-7.

[13] See n. 8.

[14] Found in Aristotle at least two or three times (*e.g.* VI *Phys.*, 5, 236b7), and very frequently in the commentators (e.g. Themistius, Philoponus, Simplicius, St. Thomas).

[15] *De Sensu*, 3, 439b18-440b23. Color analysis is perhaps Aristotle's favorite manuduction to an understanding of the nature of quality.

1. To produce all other colors,

> . . . White and Black [are—RB] *juxtaposed* in quantities so minute that [a particle of] either separately would be invisible. . . .[16]

Specifically diverse intermediate colors are thus the function of the numerical ratios of these juxtaposed particles. (The great perceptual differences are caused by the commensurability and incommensurability of the terms of the ratios, just as in musical harmony.)

2. White is *overlaid* on black. Again, the ratio determines the hue.

3. The colors *interpenetrate*, blended together in a perfect homogeneity.

A *fourth* (perhaps) explanation is found in St. Thomas—a *per accidens* division of quality which is not precisely a division *secundum partes quantitativas.*[17] He calls it simply "divisio . . . secundum intensionem et remissionem":

> quod enim una et eadem pars sit magis vel minus alba non est ex ipsa ratione albedinis . . . sed *ex diverso modo participandi* albedinem ex parte subjecti divisibilis.[18]

He does not continue the explanation.

Which of these variation-possibilities shall we choose as a basis for our explanation of alteration? Which, while preserving the integrity of the quality as considered in itself, will nonetheless explain the *per accidens* variation involved in a continuous motion?

A closer look at Aristotle's *De Sensu* explanations reveals that however well they may explain *static* color participation, only the first will support genuine color *alteration*, *sc.*, precisely the *coming-to-be* of a color participation.

[16] *Ibid.*, 439b20-21. Italics mine.

[17] "Divisio autem albi per accidens potest esse dupliciter. *Uno modo* secundum partes quantitativas . . . *Alio modo* secundum intensionem et remissionem . . ." (*In VI Phys.* 7, n. 1612.)

[18] *Ibid.*

The *second* mode will not explain alteration, because the "overlaying" must, on Aristotle's own principles, be an overlaying of white *matter* on black *matter*,[19] and so a κίνησις whereby this particular situation would come into being must be rather a *relational* change[20] of *two bodies* than a *qualitative* change of *one*.

The *third* manner, if used to explain alteration, would involve *substantial* change,[21] and Aristotle will not thus confuse alteration with another type of motion.[22]

Finally, let us consider the *fourth* possibility. What sort of "participation" is St. Thomas proposing? If it is identical

[19] An "overlaying" of the *quality* white on the *quality* black would of course involve the simultaneous actuation of a subject by two contrary affections, which is impossible (*De Anima*, III, 2, 427a6).

[20] Or rather, to be perfectly accurate, a *local* one. There is technically no such thing as motion of relation (*Phys.*, V, 2, 225b11).

[21] Aristotle identifies this third manner of color-participation with the "combination" (μίξις) of his Περὶ μίξεως (identified by St. Thomas [*De Sensu*, 8, Parma XX, 166b] and Alexander of Aphrodisias [*Commentaria Graeca*, Vol. III, part 1, *Alexandri in Librum De Sensu Commentarium*, p. 63, 23] as *De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 10, 327a29-328b22). In this latter text Aristotle distinguishes a σύνθεσις of two bodies divided into very small parts (cf. the first of the *De Sensu* manners) from a genuine μίξις, which results in a "compound . . . [perfectly—RB] uniform in texture throughout—any part of such a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water." (*De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 10, 328a10-12.)

Such a composition, however, leaves the components present "non actu, sed virtute" (St. Thomas, *De Mixtione*, Parma XVI, 354): "The constituents, therefore, neither (*a*) *persist actually*, as 'body' and 'white' persist: nor (*b*) are they *destroyed* [without a trace—RB] (either one of them or both), for their 'power of action' is preserved." (*De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 10, 327b29-31.) Indeed, to say that the components persist *actu* would be to posit the actually infinite division which Aristotle repudiates in this very chapter (*ibid.*, 328a5).

[22] *Categories*, 14, 15a18-33. Surely there is such a thing as alteration without substantial change. It is true that the third *De Sensu* manner is designated by Aristotle as the only "real cause" of color differences (3, 440b15)—"non solum secundum apparentiam, sed secundum existentiam" (St. Thomas, *In De Sensus*, 8 [Parma XX, 166a]). Hence he would perhaps want to accuse us of reducing every color blend which *becomes* to an *apparent* one. But at least we are preserving the integrity of the alteration itself, which he has not done with his "real cause."

with Aristotle's second or third suggestion, we will have to reject it as an explanation of *alteration* on the grounds just stated.

But perhaps he has something else in mind. If this is the case, then St. Thomas cannot be speaking here simply as an exegete of Aristotle's text—in such a capacity he would have had to find the *magis vel minus* he speaks of in a variation according to some *predicament*, since for Aristotle nothing extra-categorical is real. But not in the subject-substance itself, for this admits no *magis vel minus*;[23] if through quantity, how else than through the extension in the subject of parts outside of parts—our first suggestion?[24] And if he has found his *magis vel minus* in any of the other predicaments, it becomes very difficult to see how the change itself would not fall in that category,[25] thus ceasing to be precisely *alteration*. Thus the solution at hand does not appear to be consonant with Aristotle's view of reality.

St. Thomas, of course, is under no obligation to follow Aristotle everywhere he goes. But since the explanation he offers here is not strictly and purely Aristotelian, we cannot accept it as if it were. The question is, what did *Aristotle* hold—or at least, what *should* he have held?

The only reasonable answer, then, seems to be our first, the one invoking the extension of parts outside of parts. The other three explanations, as we have seen, cannot meet various of Aristotle's own rigid physical specifications, and our analysis of the fourth proposal shows us that only quantity will support the *per accidens* division of quality which alteration demands.

Further evidence for alteration through the quantitative

[23] *Categories*, 5, 3b33.

[24] See above, p. 474.

[25] Or at least be bound up with it somehow, and this Aristotle will not allow (*Categories*, 14, 15a18-33). Alteration is a distinct type of motion, in its own right.

variation of juxtaposed contraries will be found in the following text:

> Nor in reference to contradictory change shall we find anything unanswerable in the argument that if a thing is changing from not-white, say, to white, and is in neither condition, then it will be neither white nor not-white: for the fact that it is not *wholly* in either condition will not preclude us from calling it white or not-white. We call a thing white or not-white not necessarily because it is wholly either one or the other, *but because most of its parts or the most essential parts* of it are so: not being in a certain condition is different from not being wholly in that condition.[26]

If Aristotle means these words literally,[27] he almost certainly implies our conclusion, namely that the continuity of alteration depends on the extension of its subject's parts.

* * *

Alteration, then, is the successive variation of a quality in a subject, *mediante quantitate*. In other words, in gaining one quality in place of another the subject merely supports an increase in the number and size of those areas affected by the terminal quality (itself perfectly pure). A man falling ill is suffering a gradual extension of pure disease throughout the tissues of his body—although perhaps in thousands of tiny areas. A body passing from black to white through the *colores medii* is simply having successively more and more of its extension covered over with pure whiteness. Through a microscope, Aristotle would perhaps have expected to find white spots on black in a dark gray surface, black ones on white in light gray.[28]

[26] *Phys.*, VI, 9, 240a19-26. Latter italics mine.

[27] And he *has* been taken literally: "τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο μέρος . . . οὐ γὰρ ἁμερὲς τὸ κινούμενον." (*Commentaria Graeca*, Vol. X, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Posteriores Commentaria*, p. 917, 19-23.) (This last phrase refers to Aristotle's reiterated . . . τὸ ἁμερὲς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι . . . [*VI Phys.*, 10, 240b8]. This, surely, the Philosopher intends literally.)

[28] Does our interpretation vitiate Aristotle's notion of the numerical unity of motion? His strictest notion, probably, since we have parts alter-

II. A First Difficulty

This conclusion, as we foretold, is a "solution" only in the sense that it harmonizes with most of the textual evidence. It is impossible to avoid the following difficulty.

There must be no "primary part that has changed" [29] in the subject of a strict κίνησις, since "everything that is in motion is divisible," [30] including of course the alleged "primary part." But if alteration takes place in the way which we have just described, what about the first instant of a change, say, from black to gray? Will there not be a first pinpoint of pure white? And a large number of other pinpoints of white, in the case of a "homogeneous" alteration? But since whiteness is an affection of an extended body, we cannot say that these "points" are extensionless. Nor can we assign them an utterly un-Aristotelian infinitesimal extension, since "no body . . . can be divided into its 'least' parts." [31] If therefore they are infinitesimally extended, they are accordingly infinitely divisible, and each will be a "primary part that has changed," in violation of Aristotle's above mentioned principle.[32] Yet since

ing independently of each other and of the whole. A *prima facie* defense may be found in the assertion that, ". . . parts have motions belonging essentially and severally to themselves distinct from the motion of the whole." (*VI Phys.*, 10, 240b13-14.) And since the statement in context seems to express a universal principle, do we not have to allow numerical identity in our alteration if we are to save the same for *any* motion?

But the "parts" spoken of here are undoubtedly *indistinguishable potential* parts, such as the ones he refers to immediately below: "The distinction may be seen most clearly in the case of a revolving sphere, in which the velocities of the parts near the centre and of those on the surface are different from one another and from that of the whole . . ." (*Ibid.*, b15-17.) *Our* parts, on the other hand, are clearly delineated by the contrary qualities. So it seems that alteration cannot, strictly speaking, be "numerically one" unless the motion begins from only *one* "pinpoint"; homogeneous changes will each be numerically plural.

[29] *VI Phys.*, 5, 236a27-36.

[30] *Ibid.*, VII, 1, 242a6 and quite often.

[31] *De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 10, 328a5.

[32] *Objection*: Obviously a body cannot be *modified* by *any* accident at an

any other explanation of alteration would, as we have seen, involve still more fundamental difficulties, we must abide by the one we have chosen.[33]

III. Another Difficulty

A second question involved in the alteration problems we are investigating is whether all instances [34] of alteration *are* indeed

extensionless point. But consider the case of *local* motion: here the subject rescues itself from a primary-part situation in virtue of its preliminary *contact* with its terminus at a single point; only after this *contact* does it *move into* the terminal place continuously, so that any "in place" portion of the body will be infinitely divisible right back to the point of preliminary contact. Now, why not something precisely analogous for *alteration*?

Answer: This saving "preliminary contact" is easy enough with *local* motion, *sc.*, where the accident-to-be-acquired is a denomination from a pre-existing substance (or surface), which the subject can indeed *contact* before aligning itself with it. But attempt a transfer of this situation to the case of *alteration*, where the terminal accident *has* no involvement (otherwise than causally and nonformally) with a previously existing substance. Here the notion of "contact" with the accident's fundament falls to pieces. In other words, the *mobile secundum locum* is first *out of* place, then in *contact* with it, then *in* it; and thus even the smallest modified part can be divided indefinitely, right back to the point of preliminary contact. But the *alterabile* is first "out of" whiteness (so to speak), then suddenly "in" it; so that a potentially infinite division of the smallest imaginable modified part will lead not towards some point of contact—which does not exist—but simply to an even smaller extended part. So the difficulty remains, unless it could just possibly be solved with "we never see a colour in absolute purity" (*De Coloribus*, 3, 793b12—spurious). Then the pinpoints would in every case be present before the alteration began.

[33] Least of all will we accept Ross's solution, which he probably intended as a way out of the primary-part difficulty: "Aristotle's doctrine with regard to qualitative change is that so far as the *αὐτὸ δ μεταβάλλει* (e.g. the colour) is concerned there are indivisible instalments of change; since on the other hand the quality is spread out over an extended and infinitely divisible thing, the whole thing changes quality through changes of quality in its parts, each of which changes is divisible into changes of quality of smaller parts, *ad infinitum*." (W. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* [Oxford, 1936], pp. 650-51.) This is to posit not the *potential* infinity so familiar to readers of Aristotle's physical works, but an *actual* one, for which Aristotle shared the well-known Greek aversion.

[34] Those who uphold "instantaneous" as the meaning of *ἄθρόον* in the

successive. There are a few texts which seem, *prima facie*, to answer in the negative.

(*a*) . . . as if change never took place suddenly [ἀθρόας—Bekker].[35]

(*b*) . . . if that which suffers alteration is infinitely divisible it does not follow from this that the same is true of the alteration itself, which often occurs all at once [ἀθρόα—Bekker], as in freezing.[36]

(*c*) Local movements . . . arrive first at a point midway before reaching their goal . . . but . . . a thing can alter all at once [ἀθρόον—Bekker], without one-half of it being changed before the other; e. g. it is conceivable that water should be frozen simultaneously in every part.[37]

But this doctrine has *de facto* been taken as a proclamation of an alteration not *instantaneous*, but only *simultaneous* in every part. Simplicius, for example, after paraphrasing perfectly the second of the above texts,[38] proceeds at once with this alternative interpretation.

Not [as if the change were] "all at once" in the sense of taking place in *no time* (this would be false), but rather in the sense that the subject *begins* to change all at once, not part by part.[39]

In other words, everywhere simultaneously, but nowhere instantaneously.

The difficulty of deciding conclusively between these interpretations is evinced by the discussion entertained by the commentators;[40] we cannot be perfectly certain which of the two

texts immediately following will have to admit that Aristotle does not think freezing is *always* so (see *Meteor.*, I, 12, 348b21). With our interpretation, on the other hand, this latter text does not conflict.

[35] *I Phys.*, 3, 186a15. The Oxford "suddenly," of course, begs the question we shall raise in the next paragraph of our text.

[36] *Ibid.*, VIII, 3, 253b23-26.

[37] *De Sensu*, 6, 446b29-447a3; "a thing can alter all at once" is my translation.

[38] *Commentaria Graeca*, Vol. X, p. 1199, 10-14.

[39] *Ibid.*, 18-20 (translation mine). Cf. Vol. IX, *Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Priores Commentaria*, p. 106, 27 to p. 107, 5, and elsewhere.

[40] With Simplicius against an alteration instantaneous in all parts

meanings of ἀθρόος Aristotle is employing in these three texts. We can, however, require him to stand by his many unqualified

stands Alexander of Aphrodisias (*Commentaria*, Vol. III, part 1 *Alexandri in Librum De Sensu Commentarium*, p. 133, 3-6; and as cited by Simplicius, Vol. X, p. 968, 11-27). Contrast St. Thomas's reference (in a paraphrase of a text of Averroes) to: ". . . quoddam probabile et famosum apud *Aristotelem* et *omnes Peripateticos*, scilicet quod aliquae transmutationes sint in non tempore ut illuminatio et huiusmodi." (*In VI Phys.*, 5, n. 1543.) Cf. Porphyry too, as cited by Simplicius (*Commentaria*, Vol. IX, p. 106, 33 to p. 107, 2).

St. Thomas's interpretation of these three "all at once" texts is involved and interesting. In the case of the *first*, his Latin Aristotle gives him precisely the opposite meaning from that accepted by the other commentators! He probably read: "Postea et hoc inconveniens, omnis esse principium rei, et non temporis et generationis, non simplicis sed alterationis, tanquam [ὥσπερ] non momentaneae factae mutationis." (*Sic Versio Antiqua* which the Leonine edition [II, vii-viii, ix] accepts as the translation St. Thomas used.) He therefore interprets the last clause not as a genitive absolute (with the Greek commentators and Oxford), but as modifying the genitives immediately preceding. Indeed, if this is the way Aristotle meant the ὥσπερ clause, then that adverb easily becomes "seeing that" instead of "as if," and we would translate: "Then this too is absurd [i.e. this is Melissus' *second* fallacy, with which he argues that being, having no beginning, must be infinite], to think of every "beginning" as a beginning of a *thing* [*sc.* as a *quantitative* limit]—rather than of a *time* or of a process of *generation* [for these also have a "beginning"] (by "generation" I mean not *absolute* generation, but *alteration*)—seeing that the latter is not a change which takes place instantaneously." ". . . totius alterationis," St. Thomas explains, "cuius terminus est generatio, est accipere principium, cum non sit momentanea mutatio, et aliquando generatio dicatur propter suum terminum." (*In I Phys.*, 5, n. 79.) Commenting on the *second* text, St. Thomas seems at first glance simply to uphold instantaneous alteration: "Quamvis enim corpus quod alteratur sit partibile in infinitum, non tamen oportet quod propter hoc alteratio in infinitum dividatur, ita quod in qualibet parte temporis aliquid alterationis fiat; sed multoties fit *velox* alteratio . . ." (*Ibid.*, VIII, 5, n. 2120.) But he continues as if he *identified* the questions of instantaneousness and simultaneity. (As, incidentally, he would have to do if perchance he held the very interpretation of the nature of alteration that we have concluded to [above, p. 478]! See n. 41.) ". . . ita scilicet quod multae partes corporis alterati simul alterantur, sicut accidit in densatione sive congelatione aquae. Tota enim aliqua aqua simul congelatur, non pars post partem . . ." (*Ibid.*). The reason? Earlier in the same work he explains: "Manifestum est enim, quod omnis alteratio fit per virtutem agentis quod alterat, cuius virtus quanto fuerit maior tanto maius corpus alterare potest. Quia igitur alterans est finitae virtutis, usque ad determinatam

statements of the continuity of κίνησις. Unless he has violated these in the texts under consideration, he must espouse the interpretation of Simplicius.[41]

quantitatem corpus alterabile subditur eius virtuti, et simul recipit impressionem agentis; unde simul alteratur totum, non pars post partem." (*Ibid.*, VI, 5, n. 1553.) Is he really identifying the questions of the simultaneous and instantaneous, which the other commentators distinguish? At any rate, he compromises on his explanation: "*Verumtamen*, et in hoc ipso quod simul alteratur est quandam successionem considerare: quia cum alteratio fiat per contactum alterantis [*Physics*, III, 2, 202a6—RB], partes alterati quanto magis appropinquant ad corpus alterans perfectius a principio recipiunt impressionem alterantis [cf. *ibid.*, VIII, 10, 267b7—RB]; et sic successive secundum ordinem partium ad perfectam alterationem pervenitur, et maxime quando in corpore alterabili est aliquid contra resistens alteranti." (*Ibid.* n. 1555.) Now, the *corpus alterans* can obviously never be in immediate "contact" with the *whole* body, since contact belongs to extremities (*Phys.*, V, 3, 226b23)—not even in the case of freezing, where the cold air touches the whole *surface*. But the *alterabile* in question is infinitely divisible (*De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 10, 328a5), and any "part" St. Thomas can be speaking of will have parts of its own in turn. Thus there would seem to be no limit to the "parts of parts" series St. Thomas is beginning. But he will no more posit Ross's infinity-in-act (see n. 33) than he will categorically deny Aristotle's instantaneous or simultaneous alteration. Instead, he says "perfectius a principio." And so it seems that St. Thomas's analysis of alteration bears out our own (above, pp. 477-478), which indeed demands a *successio*, but none involving an infinite regress; rather, we are left with a "primary part that has changed" (above, sect. II, pp. 478-479).

We leave all these intricacies behind, however, as we pass to St. Thomas's interpretation of the *third* of Aristotle's "all at once" texts. Here he very plainly sides with Simplicius (probably a few years later: see Vernon J. Bourke, *Introduction to the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas* [Introduction to the Parma edition] [New York, 1948], p. xiii, n. 41 and p. xiv, n. 61): "In alterationibus enim successivis attenditur successio secundum distantiam unius contrarii ab alio ⟨*deest fortasse* per⟩ determinata media: in qua quidem distantia tota magnitudo corporis, in quam potest immediate virtus primi alterantis, consideratur sicut unum subjectum, quod *statim simul incipit moveri* . . . prima pars alteratur ab ipso primo alterante, et simul et subito, quia *non est ibi successio ex parte magnitudinis, sed solum ex parte contrariarum qualitatum* . . ." (*In De Sensu*, Parma, XX, 188a. Italics mine.)

[41] The interpretation must be modified, of course, so that it will be in accord with our analysis of alteration (cf. *supra*, pp. 477-478). "Everywhere simultaneous" for us must mean that (instantaneous) "primary parts" can appear in all quarters of the subject simultaneously.

IV. Summary

Because of the *per se* indivisibility of Aristotle's qualities, the subject of alteration must pass from affection to affection by successively participating less in the one pure quality and more in the other until the change is completed. This participation is quantitative in nature, based on the extension of the parts of the subject beyond each other, and on the consequent possibility of one part receiving the pure quality independently of the others. This raises certain textual difficulties, which Aristotle has left unsolved and over which his interpreters have struggled without agreeing; yet since the present solution involves fewer and less fundamental difficulties than any other, it can with propriety be considered the "Aristotelian" one.

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Notes on the Authors

Dr. Henry B. Veatch *is the author of two books and numerous articles. He holds his doctorate from Harvard and is at present professor of philosophy at Indiana University.* Miss Joan B. Ogden *is a graduate of Wellesley College and of Indiana. She is teaching during the present year at the University of Missouri.*

Mr. Kevin F. Doherty, S. J., *a graduate of Boston College, has contributed articles to journals in philosophy and the classics and has published poetry in several leading periodicals and anthologies.*

Rev. Robert Paul Mohan, *S. S., is a graduate of the Catholic University where he now teaches. He has also studied at the Sorbonne and at the University of Washington. He is an associate editor of The American Ecclesiastical Review.*

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From the Secretary's Desk

Annual Meeting

AS STATED in the July issue, the thirty-first annual meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association will take place at the Conrad Hilton Hotel in Chicago on Easter Tuesday and Wednesday, April 23 and 24, 1957. The general subject selected will be "Ethics and Other Knowledges," the morning sessions to consider various phases of the general theme and the afternoon sessions to be made up from those who have volunteered papers in the various divisions of philosophy. Each member of the Association has received an invitation to volunteer to read such a paper. The deadline for reply is October 10. A one hundred and fifty word summary of all papers of both the general and sectional sessions must be in the hands of the Secretary not later than October 20 for publication in the January issue of The New Scholasticism which goes to press on November 1. Again, as in the past two years our Association is arranging for a joint session with the National Catholic Educational Association for the evening of April 24 at Milwaukee where the latter will be holding its annual meeting.

Papers thus far assigned for the general sessions are: "St. Thomas and Modern Catholic Moral Philosophy," by the Rev. I. Th. Eschmann, O. P., of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto; "Ethics and the Faith," by the Rev. John J. Doyle, S. J., West Baden College; and "Ethics and Natural Theology, by the Rev. Robert O. Johann, S. J., Loyola College, Shrub Oak, N. Y. A final paper on "Ethics and Epistemology" has not yet been assigned.

Program Procedure

In the general letter sent out by the secretary in May asking for volunteers for papers at our forthcoming Chicago meeting the secretary asked for general suggestions on the work of the Association, its method of procedure at its annual meeting or local conference meetings. Several very helpful suggestions were received. We should like particularly to record for consideration of the membership the following observations of Dr. Rudolf Allers of Georgetown University:

It seems to me quite obvious that there is today more willingness on

the part of non-Catholic philosophers to enter into a discussion of many problems with the defenders of the Catholic ideas. I am confident that this fact has not escaped your attention either, and so it is hardly necessary that I refer to concrete instances.

If this be the situation, it becomes desirable that the American Catholic Philosophical Association respond somehow. Since the annual convention is not, as I believe, the place where Catholic and non-Catholic philosophers might meet each other and exchange their views, the best manner in which we may respond seems to be that more account be taken of what goes on outside the confines of Catholic thinking.

By which I mean to say, that in the choice of topics account should be taken of ideas and problems which are a matter of interest to our contemporaries. It would be appropriate, I believe, if one or the other papers were dedicated to the study and appraisal of such and such a problem or individual philosopher. This should be done, however, not in the form: Dicit N . . . Atqui Divus Thomas . . . Ergo . . ., but by means of a thorough examination and impartial presentation of the others' views.

Once in a while, a paper is given which deals with some philosopher of old; thus we heard one on Spinoza the last time. But Spinoza is not a thinker whose ideas would be particularly effective today. Others are much more important. But, especially, it is the living philosophers or those who belong to our own age who deserve consideration.

I do not presume to make any definite proposals. But just for the sake of illustration, let me refer to such facts as the endeavors on the part of some to overcome ethical relativism by founding a universally obligatory ethics on the analysis of human nature; or to the realistic philosophy which attracts a steadily growing number of minds; or to the wealth of data which the various representatives of phenomenological schools have collected and which await integration into the system of a *philosophia perennis*; not to mention "existentialism" which, since Sartre's great treatise has been translated and many of Marcel's works as well as some by Jaspers and Heidegger, will no doubt play a definite role in the near future.

Then, in regard to the practical organization of the convention, it might be advisable that one adopt the same procedure as that of the American Philosophical Association, that is, send out at a relatively early time, mimeographed papers, so that these need not be read *in toto* at the sessions. They are supposed to be known to all participants. A commentary is offered, after the speakers—usually two or even three are assigned to one topic—have briefly summarized their ideas and taken a stand in regard to each other. The comment is answered by the speakers, whereupon the discussion is open for the floor. This not only saves time, but also enables the members who desire to speak on the topic to prepare their remarks beforehand. (It may be, however, that some such procedure is already under consideration.)

Along the same lines Father Davis, editor of *America*, had an article in the May 12 issue of *America* entitled, "Five Live Problems For

Catholics," concerning certain problems for the Catholic intellectual of today. He particularly emphasized the failure of the Catholic philosopher to join in the activities of non-Catholic philosophical groups as evidence of what might be called a ghetto-like attitude amongst our philosophers. He indicated the small number of members of the American Catholic Philosophical Association who are members of the American Philosophical Association. In a word we tend to keep to ourselves. By way of rejoinder in a later issue of *America* it was pointed out that the American Catholic philosophers find very little of interest in the programs of the American Philosophical Association by reason of the latter's rather complete lack of interest in metaphysical discussions. It was pointed out that the relatively new Metaphysical Society of America has a very large number of members who are also members of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and who attend the annual meetings of the Metaphysical Society of America. Indeed our own President, Fr. Klubertanz, is now also President of the Metaphysical Society of America, having been elected to that office at a meeting of the Society at Fordham University last March. One difficulty in the way of joint sessions stems from the fact that the American Philosophical Association always meets at some particular college from which it has received a definite invitation and this meeting is during the Christmas holidays. The one joint session which was arranged between the two associations was quite entirely at the initiative of our Association. In some respects it did not meet the expectations of those who had made the arrangements for it.

Second Afternoon Sessions

It has been observed that our second afternoon sessions are not always well attended because of the desire of some members to depart around the middle of that afternoon. Perhaps this difficulty could be overcome by a rearrangement of our various sessions. The first morning general session and the first afternoon sectional sessions could remain as at present. The two papers of the second morning general session might be moved to the evening of the first day of the meeting. The second afternoon sessions could then be moved up to the morning of that day. We could then have an annual luncheon on the second day at 1:00 p. m. with the Presidential Address following. In the event that a Medal is awarded the medalist could also speak at this luncheon. This would bring our sessions to a close at approxi-

mately 3:00 p. m., which would seem to be a more favorable time than the present closing. The secretary would be glad to have membership reaction to this suggestion.

Ninth Northwest Conference on Philosophy

The Northwest Regional Conference of the American Catholic Philosophical Association held its ninth annual joint conference with the Northwest Philosophical Conference at the University of Idaho on April 21, 1956. We received a notice of this joint session too late for inclusion in the July issue. This Conference is an excellent example of meetings of Catholic and non-Catholic philosopers. The joint Conference had for its president, Dr. Edward C. Moore of the University of Idaho and for its secretary, Rev. A. D. Tourigny, S. J., of the University of Seattle. The program was as follows: The morning session was addressed by Dr. Leonard Miller of the University of Washington who spoke on "Mathematics and God in the Philosophy of Descartes," Rev. Augustine Osgniach, O. S. B., of St. Martin's College whose subject was "The Natural Law," and Swami Aseshananda of the Vedanta Society of Portland who spoke on "Reincarnation and Immortality." The afternoon session was addressed by A. T. Tymieniecka of Oregon State College on "Some New Developments in the Philosophical Concept of Empiricism," Rev. Theodore Wolf, S. J., of Mount St. Michael's on "Is Philosophy a Science?", Rev. Henry H. Kohls, S. J., of Gonzaga University on "The Challenge of a Radical Empiricism" and Dr. Edward C. Moore of the University of Idaho on "Religious Moods and Scientific Beliefs." The Presidential Address was given by incoming President, Rev. William J. Carney, S. J., of Gonzaga University whose subject was "John Wild and the Theory of Natural Law." The day prior to the joint session the Northwest Regional Conference our own Association had its own separate meeting at Gonzaga University in Seattle. The general theme was "Philosophy and Education." The speakers were as follows: Rev. John Martin, S. J., who spoke on "The Order of the Five Ways" with comments being led by Rev. Henry Kohls, S. J., and Rev. Clifford Kossel, S. J.; Rev. Jerome Boyle, C. S. C., whose subject was "Metaphysics and Education"; Rev. Charles C. Miltner, C. S. C., who spoke on "Logic and Education." A panel discussion on "Wisdom in Education" was held with Sister Vivia, S. N. J. M., speaking on "Integration of the College Course through Wisdom," Rev. A. D. Tourigny, S. J., on "Integration of the

Education through Habits—Law," and Rev. John P. Leary, S. J., on "Education and Administration."

Miscellaneous Items

A former member of the Executive Board of the Association, Fr. Ignatius Brady, O. F. M., has received an appointment to the Franciscan College of Research at Quaracchi, near Florence. According to the appointment received from the Franciscan Minister General, he is assigned to the theological commission headed by Fr. Victorin Doucet, of Montreal, which is currently engaged in editing the texts of Alexander of Hales and other early theologians of the Order. Since individual as well as cooperative research is expected of the members of the commission, Fr. Ignatius hopes to finish an edition of the *Liber de originali Virginis innocentia* of Petrus Thomae in time for the International Mariological Congress at Lourdes in September, 1958. This is one of the earliest treatises on the Immaculate Conception following the era of Duns Scotus and Peter Aureoli. Fr. Ignatius is also interested in furthering the edition of the works of John de la Rochelle, especially the *Summa de anima*. Further comment on the work done at Quaracchi may be expected in some future issue.

Charles A. Hart,
National Secretary.

The Catholic University of America,
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Book Reviews

Outlines of Formal Logic. **John of St. Thomas' "Textus Summularum," *Ars Logica.* Translated by Francis C. Wade, S. J. Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation, No. 8. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955. Pp. 136. Paper, $3.00.**

"Suicide by excessive formalization" is a verdict often pronounced over the corpus of Aristotelian logic. At least two objections may be lodged against this verdict. One is that Aristotelian logic is showing increasing signs of life. The other is a suggestion that it has been under-formalized.

Evidence for these objections is provided by Fr. Wade's translation of part of a work called by Maritain "in several respects the masterpiece of Aristotelian logic," the *Ars Logica* of John of St. Thomas.

John's grasp of the second intention as the unifying object of this often tenuous science enables him to avoid confusing logic with philosophy of nature and metaphysics. But since some second intentions regard the consistency of reasoning and others its truth, a distinction is made between formal and material logic, although both are formal as compared to sciences of the real. John applies the distinction between formal and material logic even to second intentions regarding judgment and simple apprehension. He achieves a liberation of formal logic, and an instrument of unexpected flexibility results. Its value in discussions on the relation between traditional and modern logic has already been indicated in this journal by Prof. Veatch and Msgr. Doyle (1953-1954).

Teachers who have seen beginning students entangled with questions like the one which has provided a framework for more than one historian of medieval philosophy—the universal—will appreciate the additional pedagogical value of John's division.

John divides his treatment of formal logic into a short text for beginners (*Textus Summularum*) and 8 questions (29 articles) for advanced students. Fr. Wade has put the "short text" into English. He translates technical expressions as literally as possible, usually by the cognate English term. For easier reading, he breaks up John's long sentences and uses a relatively lively English where no technical

point is involved. Propositions are "hypothetical," "conditional," "copulative," "disjunctive," and "rational," and a "consequence" is "good" or "bad" (sometimes "valid" and "invalid" are substituted). But "hits" translates *cadit* and "Today this matter is figured out by an easy process" translates *Nunc facili negotio res ista deducitur.*

Fr. Wade provides a detailed table of contents (no index), an introduction, and footnotes. The introduction has a section on John's life and works (the list of editions omits the Solesmnes and Laval editions in progress, of the *Cursus Theologici*), a useful summary of John's logical doctrine, a discussion of his relation to St. Thomas (he "explained and developed Thomism," but "the historian" may "wonder if his sheer excellence in logic might not have produced significant modifications in the teachings of St. Thomas"), and an essay on "traditional and symbolic logic." Fr. Wade compares them on implication and concludes that they "are not opposed, because they do not treat of the same object. Traditional logic inquires into the forms of thinking, the various ways things are achieved in thought. Symbolic logic never asks about the forms of thinking, but about the relations between thoughts considered as things."

This book merits a more attractive cover and fewer errata. The most important I noticed follow. Page 31: after "likeness of the emperor," no translation of *quae movet ad cognoscendum imperatorem.* Page 41, line 4: "definite" should be "indefinite"; line 5: "But the verb made indefinite does not" was originally *verbum autem infinitatum respondet unico conceptui, sicut diximus de nomine, et verbum negatum facit propositionem negativam, infinitatum autem non.* Page 52: "the enthymeme is a kind of induction" was originally *nam enthymema est quidam syllogismus imperfectus seu truncatus et exemplum est quaedam pars inductionis.* Page 132: after "unless you add co-existence: *and Peter exists,*" no translation of *alioquin Petro non existente falso infertur.*

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Academic Freedom. **An Essay in Definition. By Russell Kirk. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. Pp. 210, with index. $3.75.**

Due to the dictators in Europe and South America, and to Congressional investigations in our own country, academic freedom has been one of the liveliest problems for several years. All the journals have been full of the subject, the *New York Times* followed it for a while like a hound, then let it drop, and the articles on it in the educational magazines were legion. Several good books have appeared, notably Russell Kirk's, Sydney Hook's, and the two serious volumes by the American Academic Freedom committee as a part of the over-all freedom in learning project at Columbia University.

Kirk takes academic freedom as the right or groups of rights making it possible for persons "to teach truthfully and to employ their reason to the full extent of their intellectual powers." To say this is, so far, good, but it is much easier than to discover just what is the basis of the right thus affirmed and to say what are the limits of academic freedom—limits are accepted by all competent students of the matter—and accordingly to work out the why of limits and criteria of limits. For a long time we uncritically supposed an unlimited freedom, in this and many fields: absolute freedom, a sort of divine freedom, of the press, of speech, of action, of enterprise, and of the academic man. Plato was scolded, not for where he set the limits, but that he set any at all. This notion of a wide-open freedom came in part from the evolutionary idea and the consequent popularity of the progress idea: it was thought to be the nature of things that the gates should be open; in part from the idea of man's complete autonomy; in part from the fact of an age of peace and prosperity and "success," and in part as a rebound from earlier inhibitions and restrictions.

Who then or what sets the limits? Kirk suggests that the right to academic freedom comes from natural law which also sets limits to it, but he only asserts this position and does not develop it. He suggests that it is somehow embodied in tradition and the ways of our fathers, and is sanctioned by religion without which, he says, it will not hold up.

On these vital points, he is more suggestive than at all thorough or convincing. The same must be said for his appeal to academic freedom as announced and as generally practiced in medieval universities, and for his interesting running battle with Sydney Hook's ideas on what is finally the basis of this freedom. Undoubtedly, Hook makes de-

mocracy into an absolute, as Kirk alleges, and Kirk is correct of course in saying that democracy is not a god, not an end in itself, but a means to certain ends, chief among which are freedom and justice.

It is ever so good to have Kirk's and the other recent studies on academic freedom. The authors are aware of and concerned about the threat to man in the threats, to put it mildly, to academic freedom, and their works are like an installment on more profound and exact works that must come. They are like an overture, a tentative feeling out of the problems involved. Happily, Russell Kirk continues with various aspects of the problem, and seems to be aware now that anything like a thorough study of the idea of academic freedom, and the sane adjudication of matters of practice, is going to require close study of "prudence," the practical intellectual virtue which consists, as St. Thomas says, "precisely" in knowing how to manage means in relation to ends.

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Sociologie et pluralisme dialectique. **Introduction à l'oeuvre de Georges Gurvitch. By René Toulemont. Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1955. Pp. 276. $2.50.**

A branch of learning is defined through its object. Nominally, the term "sociology" means the study of companions ("*socii*"), that is, of man as a companion. Sociology, then, is the study of men as members of society. But "men as members of society" is the object also of the science of politics as embracing domestics (concerning the order of the home) and politics specially so-called (concerning the order of civil society). How, then, does sociology differ from politics?

The answer is not easily obtainable. On the one hand, sociology presents problems which demand solution both in the light of psychology and in the light of moral science. On the other hand, the solution of the problems presupposes some knowledge both of psychology and of moral science. Under the first aspect, sociology could be a dialectic arousing interest in psychological and moral matters. Under the second aspect, the dialectic could play a rôle in the transition from vague knowledge concerning psychological and moral matters to a clear knowledge thereof, or it could be an aid in the transition from

moral science respectively to domestic and regnative prudences. The presentation of sociology is clearer as the teacher has a more perfect scientific knowledge of psychology and ethics and to the extent that he has discerned the practice of domestic prudence as well as regnative prudence in the light of the conclusions of moral science. The difference between Thomistic and non-Thomistic sociologists lies especially in the difference between the Thomistic possession of psychology and ethics as sciences and the lack of this precise, scientific knowledge on the part of the non-Thomists.

For many non-Thomists sociology is a branch of knowledge utterly confused with psychology and ethics, and consequently, according to the principles actually possessed by these scholars, the latter branches of knowledge must remain in the status of dialectics. It seems, however, that the dialectics of American non-Thomistic sociologists differs from that of their European counterparts as pragmatism differs from idealism; that is, the Americans have been preoccupied with "facts," the Europeans with "metaphysics" (p. 5). By "metaphysics" is meant not metaphysics as a science and wisdom, but a confused and (at least for the present) disorderly inquiry for ultimate causes. It is the disorder of the inquiry which has fundamentally put European non-Thomistic sociology in its present sorry state, a search for remedies without an order whereby the mind can discover true and lasting remedies.

George Gurvitch was born in Russia. Although he shared the false socialistic ideal with those who took part in the 1917 Revolution, he was disillusioned by the course of events following the Revolution. He then became interested in the thought of Bergson and the political theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and eventually in the theories of Proudhon and Hauriou. Yet he judged the teachings of these men according to the idealism of Fichte and the phenomenology of Husserl and Scheler (pp. 6-7). We should expect, then, that the thought of Gurvitch should be predominantly idealistic. In fact, his teaching is idealistic only in the sense that it is a dialectic not as yet resolved into scientific precision. The book under review indicates the progress of this dialectic.

Understanding the position of a sociologist like Gurvitch presupposes more explanation than can be offered in a book review. One fundamental aspect, however, which serves to explain this position is that the non-Thomistic philosophers from the sixteenth century onwards theorized on the thought current among the intellectual leaders of the various European countries, and that the formulated philosophical

theories pushed this current thought to ever more explicit conclusions which were in conformity with principles held either implicitly or explicitly. The defect common to these philosophers was that their logic was based almost exclusively upon an explicit knowledge of mathematics. Mathematics, however, proximately serves the sciences of the various arts, like architecture, music and painting. Because of this defective logic, then, these thinkers confused physics, ethics and metaphysics with the sciences of the arts (a confusion most easily discernible in the writings of Descartes, Hobbes, and Kant). The educational systems in various countries were gradually impregnated by this false, mathematicist order of learning. The sovereigns occasioning the growth of this "order" (like Frederick II of Prussia) or educated according to it (like Louis XV of France) consequently attempted to rule according to a politics confused with the sciences of the arts, and they easily confused prudence with the contemplative aspect of art. As a result, true moral science and true prudence were forgotten, and the minds of various sovereigns were blinded against recognizing the truly natural human inclinations. The resultant, extreme artificiality in social life became so unbearable that it occasioned a wide acceptance of Rousseau's doctrine concerning the so-called "return to nature." Because Rousseau extended the false principle of romanticism to all the parts of philosophy, he is aptly called the "Father of Romanticism."

Repugnance against the romanticist character of European society during the nineteenth century, in turn, occasioned an investigation into the definition of what is truly natural according to human nature. The first fruits of this investigation were accomplished by members of the restored religious orders and congregations, especially the Dominicans, the Jesuits, and the Benedictines. However, the progress of investigation on the part of religious has been considerably hindered by the conditions of secularized society. Thus, among many religious, and even more so among European lay scholars, the examination of truly human inclinations and the other truths of the moral order is presently and predominantly in the status of dialectics.

The status of dialectics, however, is a status of vague knowledge, which becomes clear as the possible answers involved in dialectics are resolved into specific answers. Metaphysics as wisdom is an end corresponding to the first principles of all human thought. Moreover, metaphysics makes the discernment among the sciences. Since dialectics as such, however, does not attain even the status of science, dialectics begins with a confusion of all the sciences. As the sciences are not dis-

cerned to be mutually distinct, yet there remains a confusion of the matters within each science.

Now we are prepared to examine the progress of Gurvitch's own dialectics. With the German idealists (e. g. Hegel and Fichte) there was the confusion of all sciences with logic as an art; and yet Fichte started to note the distinction between the real and the logical (pp. 11-15). Later thinkers started to discern the difference between physics and metaphysics, and yet, still laboring under the influence of mathematicism, they still confused these sciences with mathematics. In the field of sociology, they took the norm to be something mathematically determinable (chap. 2). Lacking the science of psychology as such, they tried to define the moral aim as "duty" (p. 13), moral activity as that which proceeds from "sentiment" (p. 47). Gurvitch tries to resolve this dialectic by introducing Bergson's theologico-philosophic dialectics, wherein one aims for a divine intuition of the moral order according to the divine mode (chapters 3-4). This dialectic, according to Gurvitch, is sociology, which "has for its object social reality taken as a whole," "total social phenomena" (p. 101). He divides this branch of knowledge into "social morphology," "economic, industrial and technological sociology," "sociology of the Spirit," and "social psychology" (p. 102). Since he implicitly holds that this knowledge has the measure of divine intuition, he concludes that "the method of sociology is *total*, that is, it simultaneously views all levels" (p. 105). What Gurvitch is terming "sociology" is, of course, theology as it is identified with God's intellect and participated by the minds of the blessed in heaven. Accepting this definition of sociology, Gurvitch goes on to investigate what he calls "the social reality" (pp. 97-167), "the sociology of the spirit" (pp. 168-190), "the sociology of morality" 190-196), "the sociology of knowledge" (pp. 196-208), and "pluralist democracy" (pp. 209-221). The remainder of the book embraces an examination of "variations and constancies" (pp. 222-235), as well as short discussions about general philosophy, psychology, method, morality, law, and sociology (pp. 236-264).

Much of what Gurvitch considers to fit within the scope of sociology as defined by him is very questionable, in spite of the fact that his doctrine is discerned to be a dialectic. For example, he claims that "the immediate datum of morality is a form of creative freedom"; "morality is completely alogical, qualitative, and autonomous in its immediate levels, while law is partially logicized quantitative, and heteronomous" (p. 169). "Religious experience properly so-called is 'an act

of intuitive anxiety' accompanied by an 'intuition of salvation, procured by revelation and granted to a community of believers, namely, the Church'" (p. 170). This experience, according to him, "is a participation in the Absolute, the Sacred, the Divine, radically different from participation in the Spirit; one participates in the latter by value and even more so by creative freedom; one opens oneself to the Absolute by submission and humility" (*Ibid.*). Yet a patient defender of the Faith can reduce the difficulties in this dialectic to scientific statement.

We wish to thank René Toulemont for his care in presenting the teaching of Gurvitch. The difficulties which he shows in Gurvitch's system are difficulties which are the concern of many European scholars. In delineating this system, then, Toulemont offers a challenge to the missionary who, with Christ, really thirsts for the souls of those who, caught in the meshes of contemporary dialectics, cannot find the door to the truth which really saves.

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Santayana and the Sense of Beauty. **By Willard E. Arnett. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. Pp. xv + 252, with index. $4.50.**

This book is more than a study of Santayana's theory of the beautiful. It is rather an attempted synthesis of Santayana's philosophy by means of his concept of aesthetics. The author, Willard E. Arnett, received his Ph. D. from Columbia University where he was an assistant to the late Irwin Edman in the Philosophy of Art. Convinced that Santayana's theory of aesthetics and art is most indicative of his thought, the author undertakes to show that it is also most indicative of Santayana's philosophy.

This philosophy, according to the author, is a moral philosophy based on a comprehensive knowledge of nature and of man as an integral part of nature. The correlation of the philosophy and aesthetics is given in Santayana's own words: "I can draw no distinctions . . . between moral and aesthetic values; beauty, being a good, is a moral good." (Preface, viii.)

Eight chapters are devoted to various phases of Santayana's philosophy, with a ninth chapter given over to the author's final observa-

tions, criticisms, and conclusions. Under the latter heading are some worthwhile comparisons of Santayana's thought with "contemporary naturalistic humanism." Especially acceptable is the author's emphasis upon the difference between Santayana's contemplation of truth and "the most prevalent philosophies of action—pragmatism and instrumentalism" (p. 206).

This review will attempt to show the direction of the author's synthesis by instances of his use of aesthetics as the unifying principle. In Chapter One, "Reason, and the Good Life," he writes: "The good life . . . is conceived and expressed largely in artistic and aesthetic terms: it is a work of art in so far as it is something to be made from given materials; and it is aesthetic in so far as it is an ordered and harmonious whole, which is contemplated as a perfection achieved, pleasing to man as a man because of its affinity to his psyche and its needs, but potentially pleasing to any free spirit whose sympathies are always with wholeness and harmony" (p. 10).

In Chapter Three: "Imagination, Art and Science," the author analyzes Santayana's meaning of imagination. He finds "no sharp or radical distinction between the powers of imagination and the powers of intelligence or understanding. . . . The only valid distinction . . . is functional" (pp. 59-60). The Chapter's theme is set by the following: ". . . the imagination, as the source of both art and science and the unifier of mankind by means of its visions, is for Santayana the most important of man's faculties" (p. 71).

Aesthetics as the synthesizing principle is not always apparent in the author's presentation. In Chapter Eight, "Aesthetics and Political Systems," there are a few scattered quotations about the aesthetic character of some forms of government, but the main analysis of government and preferences for political systems is based on something more basic than aesthetics. Again, in Chapter Five, "Aesthetics in the Realms of Matter, Essence, and Truth," the author attempts to explain away Santayana's affirmation: "My theory of essence and of intuition of essence has nothing to do with aestheticism" (p. 123).

Aside from a few mild or hesitant criticisms of Santayana's thought, the author appears to approve of it as a totality. In such approval the author commits himself to a host of inconsistencies in Santayana's philosophy. In the author's own words, "matter—substance . . . [is] continually in flux" (p. 115) yet he approves of Santayana's "'concretions in discourse' and 'concretions in existence' no matter how rapidly things are flowing or changing" (p. 216). The call to a life

of the spirit has a mocking ring in the meaning of "spirit's" radical identification with, and confinement to, matter (p. 138). Coupled with the certainty that "there is and can be no such thing as free spirit" (p. 219) and that an individual life is only a brief existence, the injunction "to see things under the form of eternity" (p. 224) is worse than meaningless. It is to have man striving for ideals which "do not exist—except as categories or constructs of the human mind. And neither the ideal nor the supernatural is a power to be reckoned with in this world or in another" (p. 18). "God is not a power but an ideal; God is what is longed for, not that which is" (p. 15). And yet without any sufficient reason for the world of essences and ideals in Santayana's philosophy, the author speaks of ideals in the realm of essence "which are justified by their intrinsic value—that is, if it be remembered that an *intrinsic value*, as Santayana uses the term, is a good in itself not in the Kantian but in the Aristotelian sense" (p. 207).

No more than Santayana is the author convincing on these and other related topics. Nor will there be lacking opposition to his claim that "no one, possibly, since Plato, has recognized as adequately and at the same time emphasized as eloquently as Santayana the spiritual dimension of man and its inevitable presence in any concept or actual occurrence of complete moral fulfillment" (p. 226).

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Dialectique de l'Affirmation. **Essai de métaphysique réflexive. By André Marc, S. J. Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1952. Pp. 731. 450 fr.**

This book presents a careful, leisurely treatment of the great metaphysical problems. The author emphasizes the views of modern and contemporary philosophers such as Hegel, Hamelin, Lavelle. Despite occasional refutations of modern theories, Fr. Marc becomes so engrossed in the terminology and dialectic of modern thought (cf. p. 30, 32, 44, 47-51 . . .) that one might wonder where he stands were it not for the fine expositions of Thomistic views in other parts of his long work. Still the author believes in stressing the positive elements of truth. He is more the conciliator than the antagonist.

After an introduction dealing with the object and method of meta-

physics (pp. 17-71), part I treats of being and its transcendental properties (pp. 71-293), part II covers the divisions of being, analogy, causes, essence-existence and the possibles (pp. 293-532), part III studies the categories, the problems of individuation and person, dialectic and deduction (pp. 532-717). There are indexes of proper names (pp. 721-725) and of subjects (pp. 727-728).

The author intends to show how problems present themselves to the mind and to expound the most outstanding theories in an attempt to reach a solution (p. 7). Since affirmation is a commitment to the real, a "dialectic of affirmation" is a development of the mind's initiative in exploring the problems of reality (cf. p. 12). The author strives to apply philosophy to the personal betterment and ultimate fulfillment of the human being. His work takes on the aspect of a philosophical therapeutic. At times, however, the digressions and numerous detailed applications seem to distract from the essence of the subject.

Fr. Marc teaches that metaphysics is both analytical and synthetic; the two aspects are necessary and complementary (cf. p. 699). In an earlier work by the author, *Psychologie Réflexive*, the mind passes from the *particular* to *being*. The work of metaphysics consists in passing from *being* to the *many beings* (p. 336). The author emphasizes that abstraction does not constitute a withdrawal from reality (p. 128). Metaphysics is at once concrete and abstract: ". . . ce n'est pas la moindre originalité de la pensée métaphysique d'être ainsi concrète en même temps qu'universelle. Ses démarches sont ainsi convergentes" (p. 28).

There are a few exaggerated metaphors which do not contribute to the understanding. The author repeats Maréchal's description of motion as "the progressive bite of act on potency" (p. 357). He speaks of act as "thwarted by its limits . . . it *wants* to overcome them and *knows* or *feels* them only because it extends beyond, etc" (p. 386-387). Metaphysics is once again identified with the whole of speculative philosophy; psychology and cosmology are merely parts of special metaphysics (p. 30). Every act of intellectual knowledge is open to an ultimate metaphysical explanation, but the author is not justified on that account in relegating all such acts to metaphysics. Because Saint Thomas states that God's Ideas of the possibles are undetermined (in that God has not determined on the existence of what they represent), he feels that the divine Ideas are vague and confused, but made clear and distinct when beings are created according to the Ideas (p. 531).

The book offers an interesting confrontation of the views of Scotus,

Cajetan, Suarez and others on the concept of being (pp. 71-103). In a lively analysis of motion, Fr. Marc refutes the difficulties of Zeno and Parmenides, and goes on to establish the theory of poteney and act (pp. 350 ff.). All the great problems of metaphysics are treated at length in the context of scholastic and contemporary opinions. The author covers much more ground than is customary in a metaphysics text. Along the way he introduces much historical material which enlivens the discussions and situates Thomism in the flow of thought.

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Kant's Weltanschauung. **By Richard Kroner. Translated by John E. Smith. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956. Pp. xi + 118. $2.00.**

Since the appearance of the original German edition in 1914 Richard Kroner's *Kant's Weltanschauung* has been regarded as an important contribution to the vast field of Kantian studies. The present English translation has been made from a revision of this work carried out by Kroner himself, now living and lecturing in the United States.

German critics of Kant can usually be grouped into two schools: the school of Marburg, which considers Kant's primary pre-occupations to have been epistemological, and the school of Heidelberg, which considers Kant's moral problems to have been the basic source of the intellectual tensions which he attempted to resolve in his two famous *Critiques*. Kroner belongs to the second school, and *Kant's Weltanschauung* is an impressive attempt to justify its views. According to Kroner, Kant wanted to establish, not the conditions and limitations of human knowledge, but the nature and necessity of moral conduct. In doing so, he replaced metaphysics with a system of ethics.

In the early chapters Kroner treats the voluntarism and ethical dualism that is undoubtedly characteristic of Kant's writings. Having conceived nature as being governed by the rigid physical laws announced by eighteenth century physical scientists, Kant could find no law in nature compatible with man's freedom. Law for man could not be based on "objects." It had to come from within. It could not be known, for this would imply that it had been imposed on man from

without; it had to be willed, and this origin would guarantee man's liberty and dignity. "There is no metaphysical law of nature, but it is the moral law within our will which is the metaphysical law. . . . He who obeys that law rises above the level of the world of sense. He rises above that necessity and order which govern nature; he enters the realm of freedom and reason which transcends the phenomenal sphere" (p. 11).

The will alone, Kant insists, can transcend space and time; and by its eternal, restless movement it indicates the true hierarchy of values and the intrinsic richness of reality. Whereas the intellect finds itself unable to attain any theoretical knowledge of the unity between nature and morality, the will in its movement towards the highest good can point to the source of all being and all existence, leading man "to a faith in an ultimate unity of these separate realms, a unity in which nature is subordinated to moral ends" (p. 30). The faith which Kant stresses here is not, Kroner points out, a faith in any object. It is faith in the self or—to be more precise—faith in the absolute self, for it is faith in an immanent God, a God that can be known only in an ethical or subjective way through the moral law within man. This ethical subjectivism, the author declares, was far more significant and decisive for Kant than was his epistemological subjectivism. In fact the latter was itself a consequence of Kant's ethical subjectivism.

In support of this view, Kroner marshals the following evidence. First of all, Kant speaks repeatedly of "reason prescribing to nature its law"; and the act of prescribing belongs more to the will than to the intellect. Secondly, Kant treats the logical forms or highest principles of the natural order as being "norms, rules, and regulative concepts"—terms all belonging to the realm of ethics. Thirdly, when treating objects as known, Kant almost invariably speaks of them as being related, not simply to reason, but to "reason as its rules or commands." Kroner therefore concludes that for Kant a thing was known, properly speaking, only when it was brought somehow into conformity with the will. Finally, even the *a priori* forms of space and time, although apparently invoked by Kant to substantiate Newtonian physics, were in reality directly inspired by Kant's ethical notion of man's intrinsic dignity. For since Kant conceived man as being superspatial and supertemporal, the representative of "pure reason," he asserted that man must be able through the *a priori* forms of sensibility to rationalize nature and elevate it "to its true essence of essential truth. . . . It is the intellectual dignity of man corresponding to

his moral dignity which enables the scientist to purify the sensible world so that it can be interpreted in mathematical symbols" (p. 71).

The theme of Kroner's final chapters is the ultimate, irreducible duality between subject and object, and the role which this duality plays in man's ethical life as conceived by Kant. To Kant life has meaning only as long as the will seeks its object. It was this idea that led him to describe "the thing-in-itself" as enshrouded in metaphysical twilight, beckoning to the will but forever eluding its grasp.

This short work of Kroner is certainly important, and it undoubtedly brings us a deeper insight into many parts of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. It is not, however, and perhaps was not intended to be a complete answer to the opposing views held by such representative commentators of the Marburg school, as Cohen and Cassirer, who stress more the epistemological concerns of Kant, rather than his anxieties to establish a coherent system of ethics. Possibly a more satisfactory interpretation of Kant could be had if the critics of both schools re-examined the theological sources of Kant's thought, especially the eighteenth century Protestant notion of man's fallen nature, for, in the reviewer's opinion, it was this that shaped Kant's problematic more than any other single force. In any case, *Kant's Weltanschauung* is a work of considerable value; and the author is to be congratulated for having found such a competent translator.

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An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology. **By Herman Reith, C.S.C. Foreword by Jacques Maritain. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. Pp. xii + 305, with index. $2.95.**

Three years ago one might have deplored the scarcity of English textbooks on Thomistic, or what is practically the same thing, philosophical psychology. Meantime, several have come to market, of which in my opinion the present is, if not the latest, certainly among the best. About equally apportioned to Author's exposition (145 pages) and illustrative readings from Aristotle and St. Thomas (135 pages), it is in four parts: 1) an introduction setting forth the method of philosophical psychology and its principles (soul and its powers in gen-

eral); 2) the study of the sensory powers; 3) of the rational powers (intellect and will) and their habits; 4) the nature and origin of the human soul. Readings, which for uniformity's sake have all been retranslated by the author, occur after each part rather than all at the end. This arrangement may have its advantages but calls for more pains to keep author and sources apart. There is also a select bibliography after each part. The index is ample and well-prepared, the glossary of terms and proper names a well-inspired addition. Perhaps a less satisfactory aspect is the organization of the whole into Parts and again into Sections instead of the simpler and more usual Chapters, though this may be a matter of taste.

In a book of this kind one does not look for great originality, and Fr. Reith is not original. In fact, he is refreshingly traditional and single-minded. What I mean is, he does not set out to remake the psychology of Aristotle and St. Thomas to his own philosophical image. He is content to leave it in the traditional setting of the philosophy of nature, and proceeds to develop it accordingly, from the more to the less universal, from the definition of the soul in general to the investigation of the rational soul in particular. Nor is his book a melting-pot of the older doctrine and the ever-shifting newer psychologies. Not that the moderns haven't anything to offer; but he believes, and the reviewer agrees, that the constant intermeddling of Freud and company with Aristotle and St. Thomas is more confusing than constructive, at least with the beginner. Though more recent thought is occasionally introduced, as in the discussion of the uniqueness of intellectual knowledge, basically the volume is a presentation of St. Thomas' psychological philosophy; and it is a faithful and thoroughly digested account, written in a style which, while not elegant, is simple and direct, with, here and there, even a sally into the colloquial.

This is the over-all impression. As for particulars, suffice a few, both pro and, mildly, con. The difficult notion of knowledge as immaterial and intentional union is well handled. Still good, though they might have been better, are the remarks on error in the sense. The essentials, however, are here, and it is not the author"s fault that current Thomistic literature is almost completely silent on this ever-vexing problem. Thorough enough also is his treatment of the intellect and its operations, though he might have hammered away a little more on the irreducibility of intellect to sense, since this has become a most crucial point. And while he shows that the basis of freedom lies in the infinite capacity of the will, more emphasis might have been laid on the indif-

ference of the judgment that makes free will possible. Here again, though, it is a matter of stress, since for the present life indifference and infinite capacity go hand in hand. His analysis of habits, intellectual and moral, is both theoretically and practically sound; and his final pages on the nature and origin of the human soul are adequate and to the point, ending with a stimulating excursus on evolution from a Thomistic viewpoint. Typographical errors are now and then encountered, but neither these slips nor the aforesaid limitations, if this they are, detract from the comprehensive excellence of the work.

In a recent interview Bishop Fulton Sheen reportedly said that some Catholic schools "may be contributing an incorrect idea of man through omission of courses in rational psychology." To which, in conclusion, it may be added that if any schools are in search of a textbook for such courses, Fr. Reith's *An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology* can be very highly recommended, indeed.

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Scientific Method in Psychology. **By Clarence W. Brown and Edwin E. Ghiselli. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955. Pp. ix + 368. $6.00.**

When human beings find it too difficult to deal with something directly, they devise a substitute or vicar and deal with the original problem vicariously. Thus, language becomes the vicar of things in ordinary human intercourse. Number becomes the vicar of things in commerce and many other everyday enterprises.

The ideal vicar or substitute is the one which can be manipulated with the greatest amount of articulation.

The distinctiveness of modern science lies not in any essential difference from earlier forms. It lies rather in the devising of more articulate substitutes or vicars of reality. Arabic numerals are more articulate than Roman numerals. Analytic geometry is more articulate than plane or solid geometry. The calculus is more articulate than previous algorisms.

Because it had fewer and less articulate substitutes, the science of earlier ages had to deal with reality in a more direct and cumbersome way. The discoveries which it did make are a tribute to the genius and ingenuity of great men.

Modern science has made brilliant success of substitutions. It has substituted the mathematical variable for the physical variable. It has substituted for the mathematical variable a calculus which permits of the most articulate manipulation.

This method of dealing with data is part of the logic of discovery, which pertains to the investigative phase (*via inventionis*) of scientific endeavor. An Aristotelian would call it dialectical procedure, and would heartily approve its use in ferreting out truth. But in the doctrinal phase (*via doctrinae*) of science, where findings are synthesized according to the natural order in which the truth unfolds and definitive judgments are made about reality, a different logic must be used: the traditional syllogistic logic explained in the *Analytics* of Aristotle.

We cannot pick and choose our organizing methodology as freely as we can select our investigative methodology. Demonstrative science imposes stringent requirements which must be followed without deviation. The price of deviation is a lessening of certitude from the strictly scientific to some degree of probability.

There is a constant danger and a sad history of reifying in the doctrinal phase of a science those constructs which proved of value in the investigative phase.

Dialectical constructs and hypotheses are feelers sent out by a science as it feels its way into virgin territory. The provisional methods and tentative conclusions of the investigative phase make this phase the instrument of the teaching or doctrinal phase. (This doctrinal order is not to be confused with the pedagogical order. The doctrinal order is the way in which the subject teaches us, as it naturally unfolds its properties from its essence. The pedagogical order is the way in which we teach others. Often the doctrinal order must be departed from for pedagogical reasons.)

Some established certitude is the starting point of every true science. For this reason every science begins with its doctrinal or teaching phase, not with its investigative phase.

The established certitude is never relinquished because of doubts and uncertainties which arise later in the study of the subject. Rather, the earlier certitudes dictate and direct the methods to be used in the investigative phase, as the science extends feelers and probes into the more recondite aspects of its subject matter. Hypotheses and other provisional constructs of the investigative phase are subject to recension or discard. This can never happen to the established certitudes of the organized, teaching phase of a science.

The decision as to when the hypothesis or construct is to be revised or abandoned belongs to the teaching phase of the science, as it finds this extended feeler probing in vain or returning information patently contradictory to established certitudes.

Provisional constructs have been likened to the scaffolding erected to aid in the final construction of an edifice. If the scaffolding leads to construction out of harmony with the original blueprint, it is the scaffolding, not the blueprint or the previous construction, which must be discarded or changed.

Too often psychologists of recent centuries have made the provisional constructs of their science the fixed points from which to assail and overthrow the long established certitudes of traditional psychology, the heritage of Aristotle and Aquinas.

Aristotle and Aquinas were no armchair scientists, as is evident from the *historia* (Greek: inquiry) which explores the way for each advance from the original certitudes of every natural science. Let the scientist step forward who would undertake to duplicate the biological histories of Aristotle with the latter's ancient tools of discovery and communication.

Those two men of old were completely modern, in the sense that they used without prejudice the logic of discovery and the tools of research current in their day. They would welcome such a book as that written by Ghiselli and Brown, as a manual of arms to go with the formidable arsenal of investigative methods and tools possessed by present day psychology. The book is written with a pedagogical skill that makes it instructive to pedagogue and pupil alike.

The defect of the book lies in its expressed presentation of science as purely investigative, correlational and pragmatic, not connected by any intrinsic relationship with a doctrinal, certitudinal phase.

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La Moral de San Agustin. **By Rev. Gregorio Armas, O.R.S.A. Madrid: Difusora del Libro, 1955. Pp. 1182, with index. 250 pesetas.**

La Moral de San Agustin is a monumental work. Using the general framework of a modern textbook of moral theology—expanded to

include whole sections of spiritual theology—Fr. Armas has selected 1345 quotations from the works of St. Augustine to present the moral teachings of the Saint in his own words.

This work is in both Spanish and Latin. The Latin text faces the translation and each passage bears a number that is repeated at the head of its translation on the opposite page.

Few of the quotations used are under ten lines in length. While St. Augustine was a master of the succinct phrase and the brief formula, it is not easy when quoting him to avoid presenting the whole passage, often quite long. This seems particularly true when there is question of quoting from his sermons. Yet, the author has generally avoided making his quotations too long. He definitely has not made his selections so brief as to leave the context wholly a mystery to the casual reader. Fr. Armas introduces each quotation with a brief sentence-summary of its content.

A Spanish critic has written of this work: "In *La Moral de San Agustin* the moral teaching is a metaphysics of man in search of the divine, an integrated anthropology in which man sees himself psychologically as he really is and prays God to raise him to what he is not yet and cannot now be without grace." For St. Augustine is the doctor of grace as well as a metaphysician of the good and love. Evident throughout his moral doctrine is his skill in describing the movement of the soul toward God.

St. Augustine's moral teaching is practical rather than speculative. An indication of this is seen in the source of the majority of the 1345 quotations: a) his *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, many of which are sermons delivered to his people, and b) other sermons of his and letters written in answer to specific questions. The active life Augustine led as Bishop of Hippo would naturally point his moral doctrine in the direction of concrete practice. His moral teaching was slanted toward the problem of the hour.

The general value of *La Moral de San Agustin* is that of any carefully compiled enchiridion: a student has at hand in an orderly fashion the more significant quotations either in a certain field or by a certain author that suggest and point to the sources for one who desires to follow them up. The present book is most welcome in the field of Augustinian studies.

Does it have any particular value to a philosopher? The answer to this question hinges on the value we assign the moral teachings of St. Augustine both in themselves and in the development of scholastic

philosophy. Such a compilation and arrangement of texts facilitates the herculean task of studying the moral teaching of an unsystematic writer like St. Augustine. Part One on general principles and the moral virtues will be more likely to interest the philosopher. *La Moral de San Agustin* is a valuable tool for anyone interested in articulating St. Augustine's moral doctrine. The ore has been brought up out of the mine of his works. It is a rich ore. Its orientation is toward God known in Scripture but there is also visible in silhouette the optimistic metaphysics that is Augustine's. *La Moral* makes easier the Augustinian goal: to know God and self.

In a twenty-eight page preface to the work the author indicates briefly the characteristics of St. Augustine's moral teaching: his dependence on Holy Scripture and his emphasis on the virtue of charity. He sketches much too briefly the influence the moral doctrine of Augustine had on St. Gregory the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. This work, however, should be like a new "thruway" to anyone with the desire to trace that line of influence in moral philosophy and theology. For Fr. Armas has been successful in limiting his quotations to the essential thought of Augustine on any one point. Within any section of the framework used, they move progressively from point to point.

The suggestion has been made that there is need of an index of citations, both Augustinian and Scriptural. This would go well with the analytical indices of topics and of authors already included. A stronger binding would enhance the value of this enchiridion.

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Logic: An Introduction To Aristotelian Formal Logic. **By Kenneth Dougherty, S. A., Peekskill, New York: Graymoor Press, 1956. Pp. 158, with index. $2.50.**

The task of setting forth the fundamentals of formal logic to college sophomores within the space of thirty-eight class periods—i. e., in a two-hour one semester course with two class periods given over to the examination—demands economy in the selection of topics to be treated and a conciseness of treatment which does not sacrifice clarity. It requires further a fairly generous supply of well-chosen examples throughout the text, plus a judicious selection and placing of exercises

and questions for discussion. Fr. Kenneth Dougherty, the author of a well-known popular text in cosmology, has endeavored in the present work to supply a text that fulfills these demands. In the matters proper to formal logic he has succeeded in this effort, with a clear and attractive presentation of such matters as the comprehension and extension of concepts, the rules of definition and division, the structure and division of judgments, the principles, rules, figures and moods of the categorical syllogism, and the structure and rules of the hypothetical and compound syllogisms.

The attractiveness of the work is enhanced by the selection of illustrations drawn from the contemporary scene. A practical detail which will doubtless be appreciated by many teachers as well as students is the inclusion of exercises in the text after the treatment of particular topics rather than at the end of the chapter. At the close of each chapter there is a list of suggested readings and a set of questions for discussion. The readings will be of interest to teachers a well as students (perhaps in several instances to the former exclusively).

The work is introduced by a chapter on the nature and utility of logic treated in a manner well adapted to the mentality of the intended reader. The final chapter presents a useful summary of the thesis method used in scholastic textbooks.

The author's occasional discussions of broader philosophical issues are always stimulating, but in some instances leave the reader dissatisfied because of the brevity of the treatment. On two particular topics within the field of formal logic proper the reviewer feels that a more extended development would help to remove certain ambiguities which exist in the present very succinct treatment: namely, on supposition of terms, and on induction. These topics, even considering the exigencies of the present text, would appear to require more than one and three pages respectively.

The brief exposé of the limitations of the logical empiricists' views on definition is very well done and will be a boon to the undergraduate who is looking for an effective and straightforward answer to the slippery sophisms so often repeated today on the relations of logic and language.

The Graymoor Press is to be congratulated on the very modern and attractive format of this publication.

Owen Bennett, O. F. M. Conv.

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Justice. **By Josef Pieper. Translated by Lawrence E. Lynch. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. 121 pp. $2.75.**

Perhaps the highest praise that could be accorded *Justice* is to say that it forms a fit companion volume to *Fortitude and Temperance.* There is, of course, a related subject matter; and there is also the simplicity born of profundity that marks all of Josef Pieper's work.

In seven brief but illuminating chapters there are explanations of the foundation of justice in rights, the concern of justice with another's rights, the rank of justice in the list of the cardinal virtues, the basic forms of justice, the meaning of restitution in achieving commutative justice, the essential place of distributive justice in government (the longest chapter), and the need of other virtues as well as of strict justice for social life.

To call the treatment of these topics merely explanations, and to let it go at that, would be to do this work much less than the justice with which it is concerned. For each topic, apparently so familiar, is illumined by one or two fresh insights that help the reader to a deeper penetration of what he already knew on another level, to a new approach that reveals an old landscape in a hitherto unnoticed light. This is what the philosopher can do for the student of philosophy; and Pieper does it admirably.

The other chief contribution of this book lies in the apt and timely application of its conclusions to contemporary social situations. For example, since justice is judged by the objective action done rather than by the subjective condition of the agent, "it may be quite possible and logical to reject a certain political objective as 'objectively unjust' —and even to combat it with intensity—*without* at the same time bringing the moral integrity of one's opponent into the discussion." Again, "since every act turns the doer into either a debtor or a creditor . . . the equality that characterizes justice cannot be finally and definitely established at any one time." It will follow that "any claim to erect a definitive and unalterable order in the world must of necessity lead to something inhuman." Other typical applications concern the relation of party politics to the common good, and the necessity of distributive justice for the ruled as well as for the rulers.

In the chapter on the basic forms of justice it is surprising, at least to this reviewer, to find no mention at all of social justice. It is true that St. Thomas does not use this expression, and that this book is based on his doctrine. But in view of the range of modern social

questions that the book does cover, some room might well have been found for at least a mention of this type of justice. Perhaps Professor Pieper considers it synonymous with general or legal justice, as do so many others who deal with this topic. But the point is a disputed one, and at least the existence of the question might have been pointed out.

Again, Pieper's brief mention of distributive justice as applying to the distribution of "the total product of community life"—for example, "food, clothing, shelter,"—seems to overlook the institution of private ownership as the principal socially tested means to that end. Further, it seems incapable of being harmonized with the specific warnings of Pope Pius XII on that precise point, especially those contained in his Address to Catholic Employers of May 7, 1949. But perhaps this is to cavil at what is without question a contribution of genuine philosophic value.

In addition to its other outstanding qualities, the format of this book is excellent, and the translation by Lawrence Lynch is a model of clarity.

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Imprudence in St. Thomas. **The Aquinas Lecture, 1955. By Charles J. O'Neil. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955. Pp. iv + 165. $2.00.**

This little book offers a challenge to its readers. Here you will not find a facile causerie that he who runs may read. A lecture, considerably expanded, it would appear, which the author has done his best to lighten by his clever use of interspersed whimsies and witticisms as well as an extended allegory which he refuses to call a "parable"; yet for all that it presents a typical specimen of rigid textual analysis that only an experienced scholar could elaborate and only a reader who is prepared to knuckle down to a session of hard thinking—maybe a half dozen sessions—will succeed in penetrating and appreciating.

If one should happen to foster the illusion that the moral philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is but Aristotelian ethics decked out in Christian vestments; or if one should be in the dark to understand what "practical wisdom" can mean to the pagan thinker who, though he richly deserves the encomium which Dante bestows upon him—"*Il*

maestro di color che sannno"—could find no place in his theory of morality for the vice of imprudence; then, the close reading of this genial and scholarly lecture will, no doubt, be found apt to dispel that illusion and illuminate that darkness.

O'Neil makes abundantly clear how radically the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas transformed the outlook of his Greek master on the nature of "practical wisdom" when he raised the question: "Is prudence love"? and dealt with it in the context of *created* man and of man raised to a citizenship outside and beyond the "*polis*" of the Greeks. Yet he none the less clearly establishes the reasons for the inevitable absence of any conception of imprudence in Aristotelian ethics, wherein the presence of the "*orthos logos*" which is prudence itself, constitutes the perfection, truth and very essence of good action.

With characteristic caution, however, O'Neil refrains from concluding from the silence of Aristotle on the question of imprudence (which he, nevertheless, demonstrates to be quite understandable, by comparing the Stagirite's treatment of art with his treatment of prudence) that he "closed man within his nature"—however difficult it may be "to escape the conclusion that the Aristotelian moral man's happiness is to be achieved by the forces of his nature." He points out that it is precisely the "openness" of Aristotles' mind on this question—(Is it due to an antinomy in the ethical thought of Aristotle, "*Le dilemme de l'Ethique*," as André Bremond called it, or was it "the insufficiency of his intuition, powerfully realistic as it is," in the words of Marcel de Corte?)—that permitted St. Thomas Aquinas to follow Aristotle in distinguishing the alternative conceptions of choice as either "orectic nous" or "dionoetic orexis," and then to remark that the latter designation is the truer one.

St. Thomas Aquinas thus found it feasible to adapt Aristotle's ethical thinking to an interpretation of morality which the Philosopher himself had neither accepted or rejected but which when taken up by St. Thomas could assign an existence and a role to the vice of imprudence which Aristotle could not consistently envisage.

It is idle, futile, if not indeed unfair, to ask an author to do more than he sets out to do. It is perhaps because O'Neil sticks rigorously to his problem that I find his discussion not seldom tantalizing. He whets the appetite by many a subtle allusion to enticing questions, relevant thought not essential to his purpose, and leaves one curious to conjecture just how he would handle them had he time to propose a solution. The exact function of "intelligibility," *logos*, in the structure of an

Aristotelian practical syllogism is one such question and the precise relation of moral science to action is another. Both of these questions either involve or lead up to the problems of the relation of the *logos* to choice and the freedom of choice as well as to the knotty question of the end of moral action in relation to the the end of man. There are allusions to these questions both in the body of the lecture and, particularly, in the notes. One is never quite sure, however, whether O'Neil regards Aristotle's method of analysis in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as empirical, dialectical, phenomenological (in the modern sense) or frankly philosophical. In the absence of definite indications on this point one cannot safely conclude just how the author would deal with these problems. Certain remarks, for example, "the Aristotelian moral man lives in a city of essential wisdom" (p. 30), "moral action explained in an existential framework simply is not the same as moral action explained by sheer intelligibility" (p. 36), lead one to believe that the author would be inclined to characterize the method of Aristotle in the *Ethics* as philosophical—in the sense of an essentialism—but he does not appear to think that this has much bearing on his problem—"Our probing must go a little deeper" (p. 36).

Incidentally, was it eagerness to get to the core of the problem that caused that little lapse of logic on page six to pass unnoticed? The implication of the conversion of negative conditional propositions are tricky enough to trip one up when one is in a hurry.

His readers will feel indebted to O'Neil for this fresh contribution to his already helpful studies in the ethics of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas and The Aristotelian Society of Marquette University is to be sincerely congratulated on this most recent scholarly addition to its impressive list of Aquinas Lectures.

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The Problem of Free Choice. **By Saint Augustine. Translated and annotated by Dom Mark Pontifex. Ancient Christian Writers. No. 22. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1955. Pp. 291, with index. $3.25.**

A welcome addition to the series of *Ancient Christian Writers* is this new translation of *De Libero Arbitrio.* This work of St. Augustine, in

the words of Dom Pontifex, "deals with a subject which lies at the heart of all theological thought, the problem of evil," and "contains the fullest exposition in any of his writings of an argument, based on reason and not on revelation, for the existence of God." The translator has contributed significant material which provides the reader with an introduction to the general historical and doctrinal background of many of the subjects under consideration.

The Introduction, after a brief explanation of the purpose of the work, gives a short summary of relevant details in the history of Manicheanism and Pelagianism, a summary of the discussion which constitutes the work itself, and a listing of ten chief questions which are raised in the course of the discussion. The summary presents an informal analysis of the argumentation of the *De Libero Arbitrio* as it advances from section to section, while the questions are arranged with subtopics which refer to various portions of the text in which relevant material is presented. Among the ten questions are listed such topics as the nature of wrongdoing, arguments for the existence of God, the pre-existence of souls, and the nature of evil; the material is arranged so as to provide a ready reference to different sections of the work.

Immediately following the translation of the text there is an appendix containing a translation of the pertinent chapter in the *Retractations* and a fifty-page section of explanatory notes. These notes, alone, would call for extended commentary since they contain valuable cross references to other Augustinian works (over 25 are mentioned) and some lengthy translations of passages from the *Retractations* and other writings. This generous supplementing of the text itself is one of the more valuable aspects of this volume.

The notes also refer to helpful secondary works in which some of the problems which troubled St. Augustine or his later readers are treated. The author refers most frequently to such standard writers as Gilson, Portalié, Thonnard, Copleston and Armstrong in his lengthy discussions of such topics as the origin of evil, the theory of knowledge, the influence of Plotinus, foreknowledge, the origin of souls. Besides giving a general introduction to the historical and philosophical background of these questions these notes will undoubtedly stimulate discussion among those who agree or disagree with Dom Pontifex's resolution of such questions as the relation of faith and reason, the theory of knowledge and of illumination.

The index of some two hundred entries devotes about one-half of the topics to individuals, writers, places or biblical passages. Approxi-

mately three-fourths of the subjects listed refer to the author's introduction or notes. There is a pronounced inadequacy in the listing of references to the text itself: body, soul, One, mind, ignorance, evil, form, will, sensation either are not listed or have inadequate references. "Suicide" refers to the notes but not to pertinent passages in the text; "free choice" has only one reference; "grace and free will" directs the reader to Pelagianism which is not listed; "happiness" has a single listing, etc.

The translation is based on the Migne text with certain changes suggested by Professor Green, editor of the Vienna edition. The chapter headings of the Migne edition are supplanted by topic headings placed at logical intervals with the chapter and section numbers printed in the margin. The translation often has a brisk simplicity which makes it very readable and maintains the animated spirit of the dialogue wherever the interchange of thought permits. Following the trend so popular among many translators today, Dom Pontifex frequently renders the thought of the original in contemporary form and idiom, eliminates many of the transitional phrases and connectives and shortens the sentences. This contributes to the readibility of the whole and enables the mind to follow the development of the thought with greater ease.

Whether or not this procedure is advisable is a question which is best answered in the light of the purpose of the reader. A comparison of this translation with that of Sparrow, who is in general faithful to the word order and general construction of the original, brings out some striking differences. These differences are often a matter of shading of thought or of impression; a long balanced construction is rendered in short declarative sentences; there is accurate interpretation, sometimes, in place of literal translation. All of these may be helpful to the reader who is having his first encounter with St. Augustine's thought.

Some difficulties which this reader encountered, however, may be given as typical of many others. ". . . Ut omittam caetera, quibus enumerandis vel tempus vel memoria non suppetit" is translated: "It would take too long to make a complete list and I could not remember everything." "Virili animo esto" becomes in English, "Do not let it depress you"; "nihil est omnino manifestius" is "Yes, that is perfectly clear" and "vehementer exercuit," is translated "deeply interested." There are many passages in which it is difficult to give a single interpretation of St. Augustine's thought but in some cases, at

least, one would question the translation suggested. Thus in Book III, 16, St. Augustine writes: "fierique possit ut corpori alicujus animae aliquod aliud corpus anteferatur, ut autem ipsi animae nullo modo." This is translated: "And while it is possible that some other body ranks higher than the body united to a soul, no body ranks higher than the soul itself." Again, in III, 39, the Latin reads: "Si autem invenit, adjuncto ejus vitio corruptionem ejus operatur," and the translation: "But if it does find something corruptible it effects the corruption of the other nature by the vice it finds in it." The original text of III, 53, "Hic occurrit illa quaestio, quam inter se murmurantes homines rodere consueverunt, qui quodlibet aliud in peccando quam se accusare parati sunt" is translated, "Here that problem raises itself, which is often brought up with murmurings and mutterings: men are ready to accuse anything else for their sins rather than themselves."

On the whole, however, the translation and the valuable information contained in this volume will contribute much to the growing number of people who are turning with renewed interest to the writings and teachings of the saint of Hippo. It is gratifying to note that this is the seventh volume of the series devoted to St. Augustine's work and the third devoted to his philosophical dialogues.

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